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This dissertation investigates two research questions arising from the regulation of 
internal controls required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The first research 
question asks whether better internal controls can enhance firm performance? To address 
this question, the relation between market-value and internal control is estimated by a 
residual income model. Firms with weak internal controls are identified as those that 
disclose material weaknesses in internal controls in periodic filings from August 2002 to 
March 2006, as required by SOX. The empirical results, based on a sample of 708 firm-
years with the disclosures of material weaknesses, show that firms with weak internal 
controls have lower market-value.  
Building on the’ efforts for SOX to improve internal controls, more and more 
firms are starting to adopt Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), because sound internal 
control system rests on adequate and comprehensive analysis of enterprise-wide risks. In 
light of this trend triggered by SOX, the second research question in this dissertation asks 
whether implementation of ERM has an impact on firm performance? The basic approach 
to answer this question uses a contingency perspective, since all risks arise from the 
 
firm’s internal and external environment. More specifically, the basic argument states 
that the relation between ERM and firm performance is contingent on the proper match 
between ERM and five key contingency variables: environment uncertainty, industry 
competition, firm size, firm complexity, and monitoring by the firm’s board of directors. 
A sample of 114 firms disclosing the implementation of ERM in their 2005 10Ks and 
10Qs are identified by keyword search in EDGAR database. In developing the proper 
match, high performing firms are defined as those with greater than 2% one-year excess 
return to develop the proposed proper match. An ERM index (ERMI) is constructed 
based on the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) ERM’s (2004) definition 
of four objectives: strategy, operation, reporting, and compliance. The contingency view 
is supported by the empirical evidence, since the deviation from the proposed proper 
match is found negatively related to firm performance.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), as a response to 
well-publicized accounting scandals, requires all public companies to disclose internal 
controls over financial reporting. Specifically, Section 404 of SOX requires management 
of public companies to issue an internal control report in which they take responsibility 
for maintaining adequate internal control, and make assertions concerning their 
effectiveness. The company’s auditor must then issue a separate opinion on 
management’s assertions and the adequacy of the internal controls. Moreover, Section 
302 of SOX requires Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers 
(CFOs) to certify in the company’s quarterly and annual reports that they have reviewed 
the report, that the internal control report contains no misrepresentations, that the 
financial information is fairly presented, that they have reported any internal control 
weaknesses (including fraud) to the audit committee, and, that they have reported any 
material changes in internal controls.   
SOX’s regulation on internal control brings about at least two fundamental 
research questions, as described below. First, the disclosures of material weaknesses in 
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internal controls as required by SOX provide the stock market with the information to 
identify firms having poor internal controls such as deficient revenue-recognition policies, 
lack of segregation of duties, deficiencies in the period-end reporting, and inappropriate 
account reconciliation (Ge and McVay, 2005). Therefore, by examining the impact of 
disclosures of weak internal controls on firm value, we are able to answer the first 
fundamental question about the relation between internal controls and firm performance.  
Second, some companies have already moved beyond the compliance with SOX 
to engage in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) (PWC, 2004). One reason for the rise 
in ERM is another regulatory change brought by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
Corporate Governance Rules that explicitly require registrant audit committees to assume 
specific responsibilities with respect to “risk assessment and risk management,” including 
risks beyond financial reporting (NYSE, 2003). Lin and Wu (2006) and Shenkir and 
Walker (2006) explain that a sound internal control system rests on adequate and 
comprehensive analysis of enterprise-wide risks, and, in order to effectively comply with 
Section 404 of SOX, firms are advised to establish ERM. That is also the reason that 
COSO ERM (2004) expanded on COSO (1992) Internal Control Framework to provide a 
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more robust and extensive focus on the broader subject of ERM.1  Besides the 
compliance with SOX, the implementation of ERM has already been documented to 
improve firm performance (e.g., see Hoyt et al.,2006; and Nocco and Stulz, 2006). 
However, one of the successful factors for implementing ERM is to consider broadly the 
overall risks arising from business environment (Bowling and Rieger, 2005). The second 
fundamental question in this dissertation, therefore, asks whether the relation between 
ERM and firm performance is contingent upon the firm’s contextual factors? Some firms 
already voluntarily disclose their implementation of ERM in their annual or quarterly 
filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and this provides us with 
empirical data to address the second research question about the contingency perspective 
on the relation between ERM and firm performance.  
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation 
In this dissertation I address the aforementioned research questions regarding the 
impact of internal controls and ERM on firm performance with two separate studies. 
These studies are presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively.  
Chapter 2, entitled “Internal Control and Firm performance,” investigates the 
research question about the impact of internal controls on firm performance.  I examine 
                                                  
1 The acronym COSO stands for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
and is also known as the Treadway Commission.  
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the market valuation of a firm’s disclosures of material weaknesses in internal control 
using a sample of 708 disclosures of material weaknesses from August 2002 to March 
2006. Based on a modified Ohlson (1992) residual-income valuation model, firms 
disclosing material weaknesses in internal controls tend to have lower market-value. This 
relation is robust to the correction for potential self-selection bias using a two-stage 
approach with the inverse Mills ratio and a propensity score match. Next I classify 
disclosures of material weaknesses into reporting-only, versus more-than-reporting 
material weaknesses. More-than-reporting material weaknesses are more negatively 
related to market-value than reporting-only material weaknesses.  
Chapter 3, entitled “Enterprise Risk Management and Firm Performance,” 
investigates the research question about the contingency view of ERM and firm 
performance. The basic argument in this chapter is that the relation between ERM and 
firm performance is contingent upon the appropriate match between ERM and the 
following five factors affecting a firm: environmental uncertainty, industry competition, 
firm size, firm complexity, and monitoring by the firm’s board of directors. A sample of 
114 firms disclosing the implementation of their ERM activities in their 10Ks and 10Qs 
filed with the U.S SEC for 2005 is identified by a keyword search of the SEC EDGAR 
database. High performing firms, defined as firms with 2% one year excess return ended 
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end of 2005, are used for developing the proposed proper match between ERM and five 
contingency variables. The measure for firm performance is then regressed on the 
absolute value of deviation from the proposed proper match to check whether more 
deviation from the proper match will be negatively related to firm performance. This 
negative relation is found and the above basic argument in response to the second 
research question is therefore empirically confirmed. This finding is robust to the 
correction for self-selection bias, choosing different cutoffs for high performing firms, an 
alternative measure for board monitoring, and alternative timing for firm performance.   
Chapter 4, the last chapter of this dissertation, provides a brief summary of the 
findings from the two studies included in this dissertation.   
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Chapter 2  Internal Control and Firm Performance 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The large number of accounting scandals during the early part of the 21 century 
resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Sections 302 and 404 of this Act require 
companies to maintain, assess, and disclose internal control over financial reporting. The 
disclosures of internal controls were intended to provide financial statement users with an 
early warning about potential future problems that could result from deficiencies in 
internal controls (PCAOB, 2004).  
The main focus of this chapter is to examine the market valuation of internal 
control of the firm. Internal controls are important for an organization, since a weakness 
in internal control might result in: 1) higher informational risks for stockholders which 
increase the firm’s cost of capital, 2) higher intentional or unintentional bias in reported 
earnings, and 3) inefficient and ineffective business operations which might harm the 
firm’s ability to persistently earn profits. Thus, weak internal controls have the potential 
to impair the firm value. 
While the impairment of market-value has been suggested in prior literature 
(Kinney, 2000), the unavailability of internal control data for firms, in general, has 
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precluded an empirical investigation. Thus, effect of internal control on firm’s market-
value remains an open question in the value relevance literature. To study the effect of 
internal control, weak internal controls are identified as the disclosures of material 
weaknesses in internal controls in firms’ annual reports now required by Section 404 of 
SOX. By definition, when there is a material weakness in internal control, there is “more 
than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial 
statement will not be prevented or detected” (PCAOB, 2004, page 155). 
To investigate whether internal control has impact on market valuation, this study 
utilizes a residual-income model, which is an established methodology in accounting 
literature (see, e.g., Feltham and Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Hand, 2001; and Ohlson, 
2001). The residual-income model is frequently employed to measure the relation 
between market-value and reported accounting information in value relevance studies 
(Barth et al, 2001). In this model, the firm’s market-value equals book value of equity 
plus present value of expected future abnormal earnings. It is hypothesized that 
weaknesses in internal control will decrease the present value of expected abnormal 
earnings. The decrease could be due to the combination of the increase in the cost of 
capital, the increase in the variance of measurement bias in reported earnings, and the 
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decrease in the future actual earnings. This in turn reduces the firm’s market-value. Thus, 
the question of interest is if internal controls will have negative impact on firm value? 
The main finding from this investigation is that material weaknesses in internal 
controls are associated with lower market-value, using a sample of 708 disclosures of 
material weaknesses in annual reports from August 2002 to March 2006. This relation is 
robust using a subset of material weaknesses disclosed only in 10Ks (i.e., not in 10K 
amendments, 10KSB, or 10KSB amendments).2  
Since firms can choose their internal controls and their efforts to discover and 
disclose any known deficiencies, there is a concern about self selection bias in this study 
(Ashbaugh et al., 2006). The concern about firms’ choices of disclosures can be 
prevented by the fact that the disclosures of material weaknesses are mandatory under 
SOX.3 Therefore, using the sample identified from the disclosures of material weaknesses, 
the main empirical finding already precludes firms’ choices to disclose and shows the 
hypothesized relation between internal control and firm value. However, using 
                                                  
2 10K is the firm’s annual report. 10KSB is the annual reports filed by small sized firms under 75 millions 
of market capitalization. 
3 According to PCAOB (2004), material weakness is the most severe control deficiencies. A material 
weakness is “a significant deficiency, or combination f significant deficiencies, that results in more than a 
remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statement will not be 
prevented or detected.” A Significant deficiency is defined as “a control deficiency, or combination of 
control deficiencies, that adversely affects the company’s ability to initialize, authorize, record, process, or 
report external financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that 
there is more that a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the company’s annual or interim financial 
statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected.” Only material weaknesses 
are required to be publicly disclosed under Section 302 and 404; therefore, this study does not examine less 
severe significant deficiencies.   
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disclosures of material weaknesses only addresses firms’ choices of disclosing those 
detected material weaknesses, but not firms’ choices of the efforts on maintaining and 
evaluating internal controls. This study, therefore, further addresses the potential self-
selection bias by employing the following two methodologies: 1) the Heckman two-stage 
estimation procedure (Heckman, 1979) and 2) propensity score matching. The Heckman 
two-stage approach starts with estimating a probit model of whether or not a firm 
discloses material weaknesses. The estimation results from the probit model are used for 
the calculation of inverse Mill’s ratio. The first method of controlling for self-selection 
bias is to include the above inverse Mill’s ratio in the residual income model. The second 
technique to control for the self-selection issue is known as propensity score matching 
(LaLonde, 1986), which creates a matched sample based on firm’s industry, year, and the 
predicted value from the probit model in the above Heckman two-stage estimation 
procedure. The predicted value from the probit model measures a firm’s propensity for 
having material weaknesses in internal controls. The propensity score matching can be 
used for controlling the self-selection problem by matching two firms with the same 
propensity of having weak internal controls, while one discloses the weaknesses and the 
other does not. The empirical findings are robust to the control of self-selection bias 
using the inverse Mills ratio and the matched sample approaches.  
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The internal control in this study is focused on material weaknesses, the most 
severe classification of internal control deficiency. However, within this classification 
scheme, there is substantial variation in what constitutes a “material weakness.” Although 
SOX’s requirement limits firm’s accountability to internal controls over financial 
reporting, Lin and Wu (2006) suggest that firms might disclose material weaknesses 
above and beyond what is required by the SOX. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
(known as COSO) and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
published, respectively, the COSO (1992) and Turnbull (1999) internal control 
frameworks that define the goal of internal controls as broader than the reliability of 
financial reporting alone. In terms of the residual income model, weaknesses in financial 
reporting-only internal controls (FRICs) might simply affect firm’s cost of capital and 
measurement errors in reported earnings, while weaknesses in more-than-reporting 
internal controls (MTRICs) might also reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of business. 
Second hypothesis in this study, thus, focuses on the fact that the weaknesses in MTRICs 
are expected to be more negatively related to firm value than the weaknesses in FRICs. 
This hypothesis is supported by empirical results.   
To better understand the nature of the relation between internal control and 
market-value, I conduct additional analysis as well. First, I classify material weaknesses 
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announcements as whether they are related to the five components in COSO (1992): 
control environment, risk assessment, control activity, information and communication, 
and monitoring. Subsequently, I analyze whether weaknesses related to control 
environment have the greatest negative impact on firm value than weaknesses related to 
any of the other four components. Second, repetitive occurrences of material weaknesses 
imply ineffective remediation measures and an additional test is to find out whether these 
repeat weaknesses are related to lower firm value. Third, I test whether market poses 
negative concerns when material weaknesses are disclosed in the amendment of annual 
reports, instead of in the annual reports. Finally, I explore whether market-value is more 
favorable under voluntary or mandatory disclosures of material weaknesses.  
The study reported in this chapter makes two contributions to the accounting 
literature. First, it uses market-value to assess the value relevance of disclosures of 
control deficiencies, complementing the literature that uses market responses to 
announcements of material weaknesses (Beneish et al, 2006; De Franco et al, 2005; and 
Hammersley et al, 2007). More importantly, to my knowledge, this is the first study to 
use the residual income model (Ohlson, 1995) as the market valuation model for internal 
controls. Conceptually, it makes sense that good internal controls can help market’s 
expectation for future abnormal earnings. Thus, the research findings reported in Chapter 
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2 present empirical evidence to support the theoretical link between internal control and 
firm value.    
Second, this research provides empirical evidence on the impact of Section 404 in 
SOX on firm-value. Section 404 has been among the most contentious sections of SOX, 
with many critics alleging that the compliance costs far exceed any benefits. The study in 
this chapter provides evidence of the impact of Section 404 in SOX by showing that 
disclosures of material weakness in internal controls are associated with lower firm value.  
The remainder of Chapter 2 proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 is the literature 
review. The hypotheses are developed in Section 2.3, while, Section 2.4 describes the 
research design. Section 2.5 details the main empirical findings. In Section 2.6 results 
from additional tests are discussed. Section 2.7 concludes.   
2.2  Literature on Deficiencies in Internal Controls 
Research on internal controls is a relatively new but a rapidly growing area in the 
accounting literature. The majority of the studies involving internal controls are focused 
on investigating the characteristics of firms that disclose material weaknesses in internal 
control. For example, Ge and McVay (2005) found that companies with material 
weaknesses are more complex, smaller, and less profitable than firms that do not disclose 
material weaknesses. Doyle et al. (2007b) confirmed Ge and McVay’s results and also 
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show that firms disclosing material weaknesses are younger, growing rapidly, or 
undergoing restructuring. Similarly, Ashbaugh et al. (2006) document that firms 
reporting internal control weaknesses have more complex operations, have experienced 
recent changes in organizational structure, are at increased exposure to accounting risks, 
and have fewer resources to invest in internal control. Furthermore, Doyle et al. (2005) 
indicated that firms with material weaknesses have a lower earnings quality than those 
that do not report material weaknesses. 
Additionally, Hammersley et al. (2007) showed a negative market reaction to firms 
that had reported material weaknesses in internal control per the requirement of SOX 
Section 302. Using a sample of 102 firms that had reported internal control weaknesses 
without other material news spanning the event window, De Franco et al. (2005) 
investigated whether the market reaction to the internal control weaknesses varied by 
investor size. Their findings revealed a negative market reaction during the three-day 
window relative to the disclosure of material weaknesses. Beneish et al. (2006) 
investigated whether the effect of material weaknesses on the cost of capital and on stock 
prices is associated with audit quality. They found a negative return during a three-day 
window during which material weaknesses were disclosed and also discovered that, when 
audit quality was lower, the cost of capital and returns were more negative for firms with 
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material weaknesses. However, Ashbough-Skaife et al. (2006) and Bryan and Lilien 
(2005) did not find a negative market reaction to the disclosures of material weaknesses. 
Instead of focusing on the market response as in the literature, this study 
investigates whether market-value is negatively associated with the disclosures of 
material weaknesses in internal control weaknesses. In other words, instead of using the 
“marginal information content approach” as adopted in the current literature related to the 
value relevance of control deficiencies, this study chooses “incremental association 
approach.”4 The key distinction between using market-value and market response in 
value-relevance studies is that the studies using market-value mainly concern about what 
is reflected in firm value, while studies using market response try to capture what is 
reflected in the changes in value over a specific period. Past studies on the value 
relevance of controls deficiencies use market response to emphasize the timing of the 
announced control-deficiency information reaching to the market (Beneish et al, 2006; 
De Franco et al, 2005; and Hammersley et al, 2007). In contrast to the existing literature, 
this research uses market-value because the focus of this study lies on how the 
                                                  
4 Holthausen and Watts (2001, Page 6) define “incremental association studies” as investigating whether 
the accounting number of interest is helpful in explaining value or return (over long windows) given other 
specified variables. “Marginal information content studies” are defined as investigating whether a particular 
accounting number adds to the information set available to investors. 
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disclosures of weak internal controls are reflected in the firm value, instead of the timing 
of information being impounded by the market.  
2.3  Hypotheses Development 
Ohlson (1995) sets out a valuation model in which current market-value is related to 
current accounting numbers via investors’ use of these numbers to inform expectations of 
future accounting data, as shown in the following equations.  
t tMV BV= + present value of expected future abnormal earnings            (2.1a) 
    
1
[ ]at t tBV R E Y
τ
τ
τ
∞
−
+
=
= +∑                                                                            (2.1b) 
    1
1
[ ( 1) ]t t t tBV R E Y R BV
τ
τ τ
τ
∞
−
+ + −
=
= + − −∑                                                    (2.1c) 
where tMV  is the firm’s market-value at time t,  
           tBV  is the firm’s book value at time t,  
( tR -1) is the firm’s cost of capital,  
a
tY is the abnormal earnings, defined as 
a
tY = tY − ( tR − 1) 1tBV − ,  
tY is the reported earning at time t, and  
[ ]E •  is the expectation operator.  
A disclosure of a material weakness in internal control might reduce firm value 
( tMV ) due to any one or a combination of the three reasons. First, weak internal control 
might increase a firm’s cost of capital ( tR -1). While Ohlson (1995) uses a risk free 
discounting rate to exclude the impact of information uncertainty on a firm’s cost of 
capital, Easley and O’Hara (2004) have shown that increased information uncertainty can 
result in an increase in a firm’s cost of capital. Ashbaugh et al (2006) and Beneish et al 
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(2005) have shown that weaknesses in internal control are related to higher information 
uncertainty and thus higher firm’s cost of equity capital. Higher cost of capital will 
increase the discount rate tR , decrease the present value of the expected future abnormal 
earnings, and accordingly decrease the market-value tMV . 
Second, internal control deficiencies reduce a risk-averse stockholder’s expected 
value of future earnings (i.e., [ ]t tE Y τ+  in equation (2.1c)). In Ohlson’s (1995) model, the 
information dynamic of the abnormal earnings assumes a stochastic process that future 
abnormal earnings will be the weighted average of the current abnormal earning and 
other information, plus a mean-zero error term (i.e., 1
a a
t t tY Y vω ε+ = + +  , where ω  is a 
known fixed weight of atY , tv  is the other information related to abnormal earnings, and 
ε  is the measurement error). Doyle et al (2007a) conclude that internal control appears to 
be an underlying, fundamental driver of accruals quality. Lower accrual quality may 
increase variation of the measurement errors in a financial reporting system. A weakness 
in internal control may have negative impact on accrual quality, which in turn increases 
the variance of measurement error (ε ). Ashbaugh et al (2006) posits that weak internal 
controls can impair the quality or precision of accounting signals and affect market 
participants’ assessment of the variance of a firm’s cash flows and the covariance of the 
firm’s cash flows with aggregate market cash flows. For a risk-neutral stockholder as 
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assumed in Ohlson (1995), the measurement error ε  has mean-zero and the precision of 
accounting system has no impact on the expected future abnormal earnings (i.e., 
1
a a
t t tE Y E Y vω+   = +   ). However, for a risk-averse stockholder, a more realistic 
assumption, it can be easily shown that the variance of the measurement error will reduce 
the stockholder’s expectation of future abnormal earning in equation (1.1b) and therefore 
will lead to a lower market-value.5  
Third, internal control deficiencies may reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of 
business operation. Cushing (1974) mathematically shows that internal controls facilitate 
effective operation by enhancing the reliability of the system, which increases the firm’s 
profit. Demski (1969) analyzes the informational role of controls in providing 
management’s operation decisions with feedforward and feedback information.6 
Deficiencies in internal control reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of business 
operations, which may lower stockholders’ expectation of future earnings (i.e., 
t tE Y τ+   in equation (2.1c)) and therefore lower market-value tMV .  
                                                  
5 According to Markowitz (1952), a risk-averse investor is willing to pay risk premium to avoid a risky 
situation, for example, the variance of measurement error caused by weak internal control. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to state that a risk-averse might subtract a positive factor of risk premium from expected value 
of future abnormal earnings (i.e., 1
a a
t t tE Y E Y vω+   = +   - risk premium). 
6 According to Demski (1969), feedforward information is to specify all facets, as well as to optimize, the 
model in order to predict the optimum control values for the next decision period; while feedback 
information is used for the dual processes of implementation adaptation and model change to accommodate 
significant system and environmental perturbations. 
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Based on the above analysis, weak internal controls might reduce a firm’s market-
value by increasing the firm’s cost of capital, decreasing the precision of accounting 
information, and impairing the effectiveness and efficiency of business operations. As 
such, disclosures of internal control weaknesses might cause investors to reevaluate their 
assessment of the quality of management’s oversight over the financial reporting process, 
leading to revisions in expectations about the firm’s future profitability or to revisions in 
perceptions of firm risk (Hammerley et al., 2007). I, therefore, hypothesize the disclosure 
of material weaknesses of internal controls will be negatively associated with the firm 
value.  
Hypothesis 1: The disclosures of material weaknesses of internal controls will be 
negatively associated with the firm value.  
The broader objectives of internal controls are not limited to the reliability of 
financial reporting as required by SOX alone. A number of key internal control 
frameworks, such as COSO’s Integrated Internal Control Framework (1992) and 
Turnbull’s Guidance on Internal Control (1999), have been developed prior to the high-
profile accounting scandals at the turn of the century. COSO (1992) defined internal 
control as follows: 
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“…a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement 
of objectives in the following categories: 
 Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
 Reliability of financial reporting. 
 Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.” 
Turnbull (1999), notwithstanding viewing internal control as a system, defines 
internal control the same as COSO (1992) to achieve three objectives in operations, 
reporting, and compliance.7 COSO (1992) and Turnbull (1999) both took a broader 
approach to internal control than SOX, in terms of scope, objectives, and approach. They 
focused on all controls covering the company’s entire range of activities and operations, 
not just those directly related to financial reporting, and adopted a risk-based approach to 
internal control (IFAC, 2006).  
Although SOX’s focus on internal controls over financial reporting is under the 
consideration of a cost-effective solution of reinforcing compliance and accountability in 
response to accounting scandals, all enterprise-wide risks, not just the risks existing in 
reporting systems, affect the reliability of financial reporting (Lin and We, 2006). 
Therefore, to comply with SOX’s requirement on internal control over financial reporting, 
                                                  
7 Turnbull (1999) defines internal control as a system, which encompasses the policies, processes, tasks, 
behaviors and other aspects of a company that taken together:  
 Facilitate its effective and efficient operation by enabling it to respond appropriately to significant 
business, operation, financial, compliance and other risks to achieving the company’s objectives. 
 Help ensure the quality of internal and external reporting.  
 Help ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and also with internal policies with 
respect to the conduct of business.  
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companies will have to disclose weaknesses in internal controls covering the objectives 
of reporting, operations and compliance in COSO (1992) and Turnbull (1999).     
The above fact, thus, provides motivation to further classify an internal control into 
reporting-only internal control (FRIC) and more-than-reporting internal control 
(MTRIC). I define a FRIC as internal control merely related to the objective of reliable 
reporting and a MTRIC as internal control related to reporting objective plus some other 
objectives such as operations and compliance stated in COSO (1992) and Turnbull (1999).  
In terms of the analysis based on Ohlson (1995) model, the negative impact of the 
disclosures of weak internal controls on firm value may arise from three factors: higher 
cost of capital, lower precision of accounting information, and lower effectiveness and 
efficiency of business operations. A disclosure of deficiencies in FRIC may simply 
contribute to the first two factors, while deficiencies in MTRIC may contribute to all 
three factors to reduce the firm value. Therefore, I hypothesize that the disclosures of 
material weaknesses in FRIC are more negatively related to firm value than material 
weaknesses in MTRIC.  
Hypothesis 2: The disclosures of material weaknesses in more-than-reporting internal 
controls are more negatively associated with firm value than the 
material weaknesses in reporting-only internal controls. 
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The second hypothesis is also suggested in the literature. Based on a survey study, 
Hermanson (2000) finds that respondents strongly agree that a management report on 
internal control using a broad rather than a narrow definition of internal controls can 
improve controls and provide a better indicator of a company’s long-term viability.8 The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also asserted that public reporting on 
internal control should choose the broad definition of internal control, instead of the 
narrow definition, to better serve public interest (Kelley, 1993).  
2.4  Methodology 
2.4.1  Identifying and classifying firms with material weaknesses 
I performed a comprehensive textual keyword search of public filings using 
10kwizard.com. Specifically, I search the keyword “material weakness!” from August 29, 
2002 to March 31, 2006.9 I read through each SEC filing to ensure a material weakness in 
internal control is disclosed. For instance, some firms reported significant deficiencies, 
reportable conditions, or risk factors, but these did not rise to the level of material 
weakness. This research focuses on material weaknesses for two reasons. First, it is the 
most severe type of deficiency in internal control and the most likely to affect market 
                                                  
8 In Hermanson (2000), a narrow definition of internal control limits to financial reporting purpose only and 
is correspond to the FRIC in this chapter, while a broad definition of internal control goes beyond financial 
reporting to include operations and compliance controls and is correspond to the MTRIC in this chapter. 
9 The exclamation “!” in “material weakness!” is to allow the keyword search to include both “material 
weakness” and “material weaknesses.” 
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valuation. Second, the disclosure of material weakness is mandatory, while the disclosure 
of lesser “significant deficiencies” is voluntary. Focusing on mandatory disclosures helps 
avoid self-selection issues associated with voluntary disclosures. I also eliminated 
observations that disclose no newfound material weakness in the current year, but only 
report the follow-ups to remediate the previous material weaknesses. This procedure 
identifies 1,585 disclosures (from 1,396 firms) of material weaknesses from August 2002 
to March 2006 (Table 2.1). I eliminate 364 cases that are disclosed in 10Qs and 8Ks 
while not disclosed in annual report or its amendment, because the analysis of this study 
is at the firm-year level. I further eliminate 181 firm-years in the material weakness 
sample that are not covered by Compustat. Finally, 306 firm-years have insufficient data 
for the analysis of market valuation, resulting in a final sample of 708 firm-years with 
material weakness covering 2002 to 2005. 
To form a control group without any concerns of material weakness to stockholders, 
I start with all available 23,750 firm-years from 2002 to 2005 in Compustat. Among the 
23,750 firm-years, 5,024 firm-years related to the initial 1,396 material weakness firms 
are eliminated. 5,273 firm-years are further deleted because of missing data for the tests. I 
also delete outliers of 247 firm-years identified by one percent of each financial variable 
in the residual income model. This process identifies a control group of 13,206 firm-years 
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from all Compustat firms that never disclosed any material weakness throughout the 
testing period. Therefore, the final sample of firms consists of 708 material weakness 
firm-years and 13,206 control firm-years. Table 2.1 summarizes the sample selection 
process.  
To test the second hypothesis, I classify material weaknesses sample as disclosing a 
material weakness in either FRIC or MTRIC. FRICs are internal controls related to the 
process of summarization, measurement, and estimation of financial information, such as 
application of GAAP and financial statement closing procedures. MTRICs are internal 
controls related not only to the financial reporting but also to business operations, asset 
safeguarding, or regulation compliance. Examples of each category can be found in 
Appendix 2.A. These classifications are mutually exclusive; if a firm discloses 
weaknesses in both FRIC and MTRIC, I code this disclosure as having weaknesses in 
MTRIC.  
2.4.2  Empirical Model and Data 
Based on Ohlson (1995), Equations (2.1a), (2.1b), and (2.1c) discussed in 
hypotheses section can be modified as follows: 
1 2t t t tMV BV AE Vα α= + +                                                                                     (2.2) 
 where tMV is the firm’s market-value, 
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            tBV is the firm’s book value, 
            tAE is abnormal earnings = tNI  - 1t tR BV − ,  
            tNI  is net income in t,  
            tR  is the discount rate,  
tV  is non-accounting information used in the prediction of future abnormal 
earnings, and 
1α and 2α  are parameters describing the process that generates future abnormal 
earnings under the model’s assumptions.10 
A disclosure of material weaknesses in internal controls represents one of the 
factors to reduce tV , because weak internal controls, as discussed in Section 2.3, may 
reduce market’s expectation on future abnormal earnings by increasing the firm’s cost of 
capital, decreasing precision of financial reporting, and decreasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of business. Therefore, following prior studies that study the value 
relevance of accounting information (e.g., Amir, 1993; Sougiannis, 1994; and Tse and 
Yaansah, 1999), the theoretical accounting-based valuation model in equation (2.2) is 
adapted to measure the relation between the disclosures of material weaknesses in 
internal control and the firm’s market valuation in the empirical setting as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1
n T
t t t t t i i j j tt t
i j
MV TA BV TA AE TA MW Industry Yearβ β β β β β ε
= =
= + + + + + +∑ ∑  (2.3) 
       where tMV is the firm’s market-value, 
                 tTA  is the firm’s total assets, 
                                                  
10 Mainly, these assumptions are AR(1) linear information generating processes and clean surplus 
accounting in which all changes in retained earnings go through the income statement. Ohlson (1995, 2001), 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Hand (2001) provide detailed derivations of the full valuation model.  
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                tBV is the firm’s book value, 
                tAE is abnormal earnings = tNI  - 1t tR BV − ,  
                tNI  is net income in t,   
                tR  is the discount rate,  
                tMW is set to one if a firm has disclosure of material weakness in annual reports 
in time t, zero otherwise, 
iIndustry  is set to one if a firm is in industry i, zero otherwise, 
jYear  is set to one if a firm-year is in year j, zero otherwise. 
0β through 5Tβ  are coefficients of the model, and 
tε  is the error term. 
                  
tMV is basically the market-value of equity 3 months after year end t. The 3-
month lag is to allow time for the reported financial information and the disclosed 
material weaknesses in internal controls to be available to the market, as this detail is not 
available until the full annual report is released. However, Ettredge et al. (2006) suggest 
that material weakness firms may delay their disclosures of material weaknesses in 
annual report or amendments for annual report after SEC’s filing deadline of annual 
report (i.e., 3 months after year end ). The market may not know about the information of 
material weakness on the filing deadline of the annual report if the firm delays the actual 
filing date. Therefore, for material weakness firms that delayed their disclosures of 
material weaknesses in internal controls, the market-value on the actual filing date is used. 
All related data for market-value is from CRSP database. tBV (Compustat #216) is the 
book value of equity at year end t. tAE  represents the “abnormal earnings” for year t, 
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measured by net income ( Compustat #58) for the current year less discount rate tR  times 
1tBV − , where tR  is measured as the average of the 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year 
government notes in year t (data for tR  is from Compustat). tTA (Compustat #6) is the 
total assets at year end t and, as a variant of Ohlson’s valuation specification, is used to 
deflate market-value, book value, and abnormal earnings. Literature related to the 
determinants of deficiencies in internal control shows that one of the significant factors is 
the firm size. Market-value or logarithm of market-value, when chosen as the proxy for 
firm size, is found negatively determining the incidence of deficiencies in internal control 
(Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Doyle et al, 2005; and Ge and McVay, 2005). Total assets are 
used in this study as the deflator to minimize the size effect because Krishnan (2005a) 
shows that total assets is the proxy for firm size and is found positively related to the 
probability of deficiencies in internal control. tMW is set to one if a firm discloses 
material weakness in year t, zero otherwise. iIndustry  is set to one if the firm is in a 
particular industry, zero otherwise. Industry classification is following Barth et al (1998), 
which identifies 15 industries based on the first two digits of firms’ SIC codes. jYear is 
set to 1 for the current year or 0 if otherwise.  
In the theoretical valuation model, “other information” tV  includes all information 
outside the financial statements that the market uses to develop its expectations 
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concerning future abnormal earnings. tMW , iIndustry , and jYear  are used in this study to 
proxy for “other information” in equation (2.2). According to Hypothesis 1, the 
disclosures of material weaknesses will be negatively associated with firm value. tMW  is 
therefore hypothesized as one factor in other information that has negative effect on 
market’s prediction of future abnormal earnings. A negative coefficient of tMW  (i.e., 
3 0β < ) in equation (2.3) will provide support for Hypothesis 1. The industry in which a 
company primarily operates may influence expectations on future abnormal earnings. 
Each year contains different microeconomic background and may also affect these 
expectations. Thus, iIndustry , and jYear  are used to control for all possible correlated 
omitted factors such as time series parameters of earnings process, systematic risk and 
environmental factors to ensure the coefficients in the empirical model are not biased.   
Disclosures of material weaknesses in internal controls can be further categorized 
into disclosed weaknesses in FRIC and MTRIC. Therefore, tMW in equation (2.3) is 
replaced by tFR and tMTR to form the following equation (2.4): 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1
n T
t t t t t t i i j j tt t
i j
MV TA BV TA AE TA FR MTR Industry Yearβ β β β β β β ε
= =
= + + + + + + +∑ ∑  (2.4) 
where tMV , tTA , tBV , tAE , iIndustry , jYear  are defined the same as in equation 
(2.3),  
tFR  is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses in reporting-only 
internal controls (FRIC), zero otherwise, 
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tMTR  is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses in more-than-
reporting internal controls (MTRIC), zero otherwise,  
0β through 6Tβ  are coefficients of the model, and 
tε  is the error term. 
Hypothesis 2, which states that the disclosures of material weaknesses in MTRICs 
will be more negatively associated with firm value than the material weaknesses in 
FRICs, predicts that the coefficient of the dummy variable tMTR  should be more 
negative in terms of significance and magnitude than the coefficient of tFR  (i.e., 3 0β < , 
4 0β < , and 4 3β β< ). 
2.4.3  10K-Only Material Weakness Sample 
Among the full sample of 708 material weakness disclosures, 106 disclosures of 
internal control weakness are listed in 10K amendments, 6 in 10KSBs, and 2 in 10KSB 
amendments. These 114 disclosures are further eliminated from the material weakness 
sample to form a “ 10K-only material weakness sample”  of 594 disclosures. The sub-
sample consisting of 10K-only material weakness disclosures is selected to address the 
possible concerns of market timing of the disclosures of material weakness, effect of 
interim reports, and resource constraints for smaller firms. First, management of a firm 
might manipulate the timing of the information to the public by delaying the disclosures 
of material weakness after the original annual report. More specifically, a management 
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can technically comply with section 404 of SOX by reporting internal controls in 
amendment of annual report. However, since the market’ s focus might be more on 10K 
than its amendments, management might have the incentives to lessen the punishment of 
negative market valuation by delaying the timing of the disclosures of material 
weaknesses to a less focused timing.  
Second, the information background might have changed between 10K and its 
amendments. For example, a firm’ s 10Qs or 8Ks might be filed between the firm’ s 10K 
and its amendment, which deviates from the information setting in the residual income 
model in this study. More specifically, MV  on the date of amendments of 10Ks may 
become the function of the updated BV  and AE  after including all information since the 
firm’ s 10K filing, while not be the function the year-end BV  and AE  in the empirical 
model.  
Third, disclosed material weaknesses of internal control in 10KSB and it 
amendments mostly mention about the shortage of resources and personnel in internal 
controls, while according to COSO (1992), small and mid-size companies may have less 
formal and less structured controls and still have effective internal controls. In other 
words, some material weaknesses disclosed in 10KSB and its amendments should not be 
considered material weaknesses for small firms. 
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To summarize, I use the identified 10K-only material weakness sample of 594 firms 
to control for the possible management manipulation of timing, informational 
background, and different resources requirements for small firms’  internal controls. This 
controlling test intends to move closer to the theoretical setting of my empirical model to 
evaluate the impact of disclosures of material weaknesses in internal controls on firm 
value.  
2.4.4  Potential Self-selection Bias  
Another necessary control test in this study is due to the fact that the variable of 
interest, tMW , may not be exogenous, because firms might choose both their internal 
controls and their effort to discover and disclose any known weakness (Ashbaugh et al, 
2006). In this study, I focus only on material weaknesses, the most severe kind of 
deficiencies in internal control, which are required to disclose under SOX, thereby 
eliminating the choice of disclosure of weak internal controls. However, using mandatory 
disclosures of material weaknesses in my sample only addresses the problem of firms’  
choices to disclose. Firms might have choices to maintain and detect weaknesses in their 
internal controls as well.  
To correct for firm’ s self-selection of maintaining and detecting internal controls, 
two methodologies are used: 1) Heckman two-stage estimation method (Heckman, 1978), 
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and 2) propensity score matching. The Heckman two-stage method starts with estimating 
a probit regression of tMW  on the determinants of material weaknesses. I choose five 
determinants for the first stage regression by consulting literature on determinants of 
deficiencies in internal controls (Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Doyle et al, 2005; Ge and 
McVay, 2005; and Krishnan, 2005a). These five determinants are described as follows: 
First, the size of a firms, TA , is measured as the firm’ s total assets in year t. Second, the 
profitability indicator of a firm’ s financial health, measured as an indicator variable, 
AGGREGATE LOSS, which equals to one if earnings before extraordinary items 
[Compustat #18] in year t and t-1 sum to less than zero, zero otherwise. Third, whether a 
firm engages in more complex transactions, measured as an indicator variable FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS, which equals to one if the firm has a non-zero currency transaction 
[Compustat #150] in year t, zero otherwise. Fourth, a firm with rapid growth, measured 
by variable SALES GROWTH, the sales [Compustat #12] in year t minus the sales in year 
t-1 and then divided by sales in year t-1. Finally, whether a firm is undergoing substantial 
restructuring, measured by variable RESTRUCTURING CHARGE, the restructuring 
charge [Compustat #376 ×  (-1)] in year t scaled by firm’ s total assets. Using the 10K-
only material weakness sample and the control sample, this probit regression estimates 
the likelihood of disclosing a material weakness and the results are presented in 
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Appendix 2.B. Based on the first stage estimation, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated 
following Heckman (1979). tMW is then replaced with this ratio in the empirical model 
(2.3). The inclusion of the ratio in the main regression helps control for the likelihood of 
self-selecting into the material weakness group.  
The second methodology to account for the potential self-selection of weak 
internal controls is to use a matched sample, based on the same industry, the same year, 
and the nearest predicted value from the above probit model. This method, known as 
propensity score matching (LaLonde, 1986), uses the predicted value from the probit 
model to measure a firm’ s propensity of weaknesses in internal controls. Self-selection 
problem is controlled by matching two firms with the same propensity of weakness in 
internal control, while one discloses and the other does not. The propensity score 
matching method produces a matched sample of 594 control firm-years.    
2.5  Empirical Results 
2.5.1  Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Figure 2.1 provides the time series of the yearly averaged market-value deflated 
by total assets ( /MV TA ) for 10K-only material weakness group and control group. From 
2002 to 2005, the series of the weakness firms are consistently lower than the series of 
the control group. This suggest, over the testing period, weakness firms have lower scale-
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free market-value than non-weakness firms, providing preliminary evidence to the 
relation between internal control and firm value.   
Table 2.2 represents descriptive statistics for the material weakness sample and 
Compustat control sample without disclosing any material weakness in internal control 
from August 2002 to March 2006. I also report the results of a two-tailed t-test for the 
difference in means of the two groups for each of the variable. From these univariate 
results, MV, BV, and AE are all lower for material weakness firms at a significant level of 
5%. Lower MV  for material weakness sample confirms the findings in literature that 
firms with smaller market-value have more chance of deficiencies in internal control 
(Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Doyle et al, 2005; and Ge and McVay, 2005). After considering 
the size effect, the t-test shows that /MV TA  and /BV TA  have p-values 0.911 and 0.722, 
respectively, meaning size effect is well addressed and should not be the concern in the 
market valuation model. However, /AE TA  is still significantly lower for material 
weakness sample after I control for size effect. This might be due to the following two 
reasons. First, this implies, after controlling for scale factor, weak internal controls till 
shows negative impact on a firm’ s ability of managing operations to earn residual income. 
Second, poorly performing firms simply may not be able to adequately invest time and/or 
money in proper internal controls (Krishnan, 2005a).  
 
 34
By the univariate results of determinants for deficiencies in internal control, 
material weakness firms have higher aggregate loss, more foreign transactions, and 
higher sales growth than the control sample.  
Table 2.3 presents a correlation matrix among the main variables. Material 
weakness firms are positively correlated with more aggregate loss, more foreign 
transactions, and higher sales growth, and are negatively correlated with abnormal 
earnings. Overall, the correlation analysis confirms the univariate analysis that material 
weakness firms have lower profitability, more complex operations, and higher sales 
growth.  
2.5.2  Main Findings 
Table 2.4 presents the market valuation model (2.3), which regresses market-
value on book value, abnormal earnings, and a material weakness indicator variable, with 
the control of a firm’ s industry and year. Financial variables are scaled by firm’ s total 
assets. The regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Square.  
The deflated market-value ( /MV TA ) is presented as the dependent variable in 
Table 2.4, with the following four model specifications. In the first column we present 
the main regression using all material weakness firms and control sample. The second 
column shows the main regression using the 10K only sample and control sample. In the 
last two columns, I present results from using 10K-only material weakness firms and 
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control sample for two control tests, in order to address the self-selection bias discussed 
in Section 2.4.4. The control tests for self-selection bias are denoted as Inverse Mills 
Ratio and Propensity Score Match under the “ Selectivity Control Method.”   
All coefficients across all four model specifications conform to the predicted 
signs significantly. More importantly, the main variable of interest, MW , is negatively 
related to the market-value across all four specifications, supporting Hypothesis 1, and 
suggesting disclosures of material weakness in internal control are negatively related to 
firm value.  
2.5.3  Analysis by Material Weakness Type 
Table 2.5 reports the regression results on the relation between market-value and 
the different types of internal control deficiencies. Recall that Hypothesis 2 predicts that 
material weaknesses in MTRIC will have a stronger negative relation with market-value 
than in FRIC, because from the analysis of residual income model, a deficiency in FRIC 
affects market’ s cost of capital and variance of financial measurement errors, while 
deficiency in MTRIC, besides the above two effects, affect efficiency and effectiveness 
of business operating as well.  
Referring to Table 2.5, across all three specifications the coefficients of the 
indicator variables for material weaknesses in FRIC and MTRIC, FR  and MTR , are 
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negatively related to market-value. More importantly, all three specifications the 
coefficients of MTR  are more negative than those of FR , in terms of magnitude 
(Coefficients for FR  versus MTR  under three specifications are -141.607 versus -
181.827, -146.323 versus -193.899, and -112.401 versus -335.770, respectively) and 
significance (P-values of coefficients for FR  versus MTR  under three specifications are 
0.021 versus 0.007, 0.035 versus 0.006, and 0.579 versus 0.102, respectively). These 
results support the second hypothesis: material weaknesses in FRIC are more negatively 
related to market-value than material weaknesses in MTRIC.  
This finding implies the value of those internal controls other than the reporting-
only internal controls and complements COSO (1992) and Turnbull (1999)’ s frameworks 
that encompass the objectives of internal controls in business operations and compliance, 
beyond the objective of internal controls in financial reporting. In addition, the above 
finding also supports Hermanson (2000) who found that a management report on internal 
control using a broad rather than a narrow definition of internal controls can improve 
internal controls and provide a better indicator of a company’ s long-term viability.  
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2.6  Additional Tests  
2.6.1  Alternative Classification of Material Weaknesses 
COSO (1992) is unanimously referred by all companies in their annual reports as 
the model for evaluating their internal controls (Gupta and Thomson, 2006). COSO 
framework (1992) has identified five interrelated components of internal control: control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring. Of those components, “ the control environment sets the tone of an 
organization, influencing the control consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for 
all other components of internal control, providing discipline and structure”  (COSO, 
1992). On the other hand, Hammersley et al (2007) suggests control environment 
weaknesses are more difficult for the auditor to audit and these types of weaknesses cause 
more serious concerns to the market. Therefore, the first additional test is to study 
whether weaknesses related to control environment have a larger negative effect on firm 
value than the weaknesses found in the other four components.  
To empirically test this question, I use five indicator dummies, E , R , A , I , and 
M to represent whether the weakness arises from any of the five COSO (1992) of 
internal control- control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and 
communication, and monitoring, respectively. Each material weakness might result from 
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deficiencies in more than one of the five components. I provide definition and examples 
of this assignment of indicator variables in Appendix 2.C. After the above classification, 
MV in the market valuation model (2.3) is replaced with the five indicator variables to 
form the following equation (2.5).  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1
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t t t t t t t t t i i j j tt t
i j
MV TA BV TA AE TA E R A I M Industry Yearβ β β β β β β β β β ε
= =
= + + + + + + + + + +∑ ∑ (2.5) 
where tMV , tTA , tBV , tAE , iIndustry , jYear  are defined the same as in equation 
(2.3),  
tE   is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses is related to control 
environment and zero otherwise, 
tR   is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses is related to risk 
assessment and zero otherwise, 
tA   is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses is related to control 
activities and zero otherwise, 
tI   is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses is related to 
information and communication and zero otherwise, 
tM is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses is related to 
monitoring and zero otherwise,  
0β through 9Tβ  are coefficients of the model, and 
tε  is the error term. 
If material weaknesses related to control environment are more negatively 
associated with firm value than weaknesses in the other four components of internal 
control, in equation (2.5) the coefficient of E (i.e., 3β ) will be more negative than the 
coefficients of R , A , I , and M (i.e., 4β  to 7β ).  
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Table 2.6 presents the results under three model specifications the same as in 
Table 2.5. Across all three specifications, the only significant case is the weaknesses in 
control activities ( A ) using all material weakness firms (with coefficient -161.882 and p-
value=0.053). The mixed results might be due to that these five components in COSO 
framework (1992) are interrelated, therefore each material weakness might be in fact 
related to “ all five”  components. The other factor contributes the mixed results might be 
the measurement errors of the coding process. I code the five indicator variables by 
reading the text of each disclosure. This process might not fairly reflect the components 
related to each weakness, since firms can choose which components to mention in their 
disclosure. This coding process may be unfair for companies disclosing more extensive 
information of their material weakness, since a more-detailed description increases the 
number of components being coded.  
2.6.2  Repetitive Occurrences of Material Weaknesses 
In Section 2.3 the disclosures of a weakness in internal control is analyzed as 
having negative impacts on the market’ s expectation of future abnormal earnings. 
However, all the material weakness firms disclose remediation plans to address their 
disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls. The existence of a remediation plan 
for the weak internal control might make the market revise the original negative 
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expectations from hearing control deficiencies to be more optimistic, since the firm has 
the ability to detect the problems in internal controls and is planning to correct the found 
weakness in internal control.    
It’ s not feasible to directly test the value of the remediation plan, because 
material weaknesses in internal control and the related remediation measures are always 
disclosed together by firms. My identification strategy is to find from the 10K-only 
material weakness sample 38 disclosures that the same firm has prior history of 
disclosing material weaknesses in internal control during August 2002 and March 2006. 
The indicator dummy Occur is set to one for these 38 repetitive occurrences of material 
weakness in internal control, and is set to zero for the rest of the 594 disclosures. I 
hypothesize that repetitive occurrences of deficiencies in internal control arise from an 
ineffective remediation plan, which results in lower market expectation of future 
abnormal earnings than an effective remediation. Occur is therefore expected to be 
negatively associated with market-value if included in the market valuation model, as 
shown in the following equation (2.6).   
0 1 2 3t t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA Occurβ β β β ε= + + + +                (2.6) 
where tMV , tTA , tBV , tAE   are defined the same as in equation (2.3),  
tOccur   is set to one if a repeat disclosure of material weaknesses and zero 
otherwise, 
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0β through 3β  are coefficients of the model, and 
tε  is the error term. 
The first model specification in Table 2.7 shows this regression results from 
using 594 observations of 10K-only material weakness sample. The second and third 
model specifications further control for two interaction terms, Occur MTR× and 
Occur E× . The fourth model specification controls the self-selection bias by inverse 
Mills ratio, using the same determinants for MW (Estimation from the first-stage 
regression is shown in Appendix 2.C). Those determinants are supposed to be able to 
predict an ineffective remediation plan.  
The results across four model specifications are mixed and insignificant. The 
association between firm value and the repetitive occurrences of weak internal controls 
are inconclusive, suggesting an unclear picture about the value of the remediation plan 
for weaknesses in internal controls.   
2.6.3 Material Weaknesses Disclosed in Annual Report versus in its Amendments  
Section 2.4.3 describes the control for 10K-only material weakness sample by 
excluding disclosures of material weakness of internal control in amendments of annual 
reports. This additional test investigates whether the market valuation concerns the 
possible management’ s manipulation of the timing of disclosures of material weaknesses 
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by delaying to the amendments of annual reports. An indicator variable Amend is set to 
one if a disclosure of material weakness is in 10K amendment (106 disclosures), or is set 
to zero for the 10K-only material weakness sample (594 disclosures).  
The results are presented in Table 2.8. Although not significant, the coefficients 
of Amend  are negatively related to market-value when we consider Amend  and its 
interaction terms, Amend MTR× and Amend E× . The coefficient of Amend  becomes 
significantly negative (coefficient -2,642.128 and p-value 0.001) when I use inverse Mills 
ratio to control for the possible self-selection problem of choosing to disclose in the 
amendment or not.11 This result suggests that the delaying the disclosure of material 
weaknesses to amendments of annual reports is negatively associated with firm value, 
supporting market’ s concerns about management’ s manipulation.  
2.6.4  Voluntary vs. Non-voluntary Disclosures of Material Weaknesses 
Even though Section 404 of SOX mandates firms to disclose material 
weaknesses in internal controls, many accounting academicians lean in favor of free 
markets system and therefore prefer voluntary disclosure as opposed to mandatory 
disclosure (e.g., see Benston, 1969). On the other hand, the value of mandatory disclosure 
                                                  
11 Here we use the same set of determinants for MW . Estimation from the first-stage regression is shown 
in Appendix 2.B. Those MW  determinants are assumed to be able to determine the delay of a disclosure 
of material weaknesses in the amendment of annual report. 
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regulation is an important question because disclosure regulations are an important 
regulatory tool. If the costs of these rules exceed their benefits, as some suggest about the 
recent Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, then perhaps voluntary disclosures remain preferable 
(Romano, 2005). Hermanson (2000) also concludes that respondents agree about the 
value of voluntary management reports on internal controls, but are neutral about the role 
of mandatory management reports on internal controls in enhancing decision-making.  
Most observations in the material weakness sample are mandatory disclosures. 
However, some disclosures in material weakness sample represent firm’ s voluntary 
disclosures of their material weaknesses in internal controls and they can be identified by 
checking the effective date of Section 404 of SOX.12 A group of 131 voluntary 
disclosures of material weaknesses are identified if, firstly, they are disclosed in the 
annual reports with year ending before November 15, 2004, and, secondly, they are 
disclosed in 10KSB or its amendments. An indicator variable VD  is set to one for 
voluntary disclosures, or set to zero for mandatory disclosures. If voluntary disclosures of 
material weaknesses are preferable by the market, VD  in the market valuation model 
should be expected to have a positive coefficient.  
                                                  
12 Section 404 of SOX became effective for accelerated filers for fiscal years ending after November 15, 
2004. Accelerated filers are companies with worldwide market-values of at least $75 million, who have 
filed at least one annual report under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and who are not eligible 
to file quarterly or annual reports on Forms 10QSB or 10KSB. On September 21, 2005, the SEC postponed 
the requirement to comply with Section 404 for non-accelerated filers until fiscal years ending after July 15, 
2007.   
 
 44
Table 2.9 shows the results. Besides the main model (Model 1), interaction terms 
(Model 2 and Model 3) and inverse Mills ratio (Model 4) are added as control variables 
for the other three model specification.13 Contrary to my expectation, the coefficients of 
VD  in the first three models have negative signs, although insignificant. However, after 
controlling for the self-selection problem, the coefficient of VD  becomes significantly 
positive (coefficient 3,102.96 and p-value 0.001), which conforms the expectation that 
the market prefers the voluntary disclosures of material weaknesses to the mandatory 
ones.  
 
2.7  Conclusion 
I use the residual income model as the market valuation model to examine the 
relation between market-value and internal control and find that firms with weak internal 
control have to lower market-value. The weak internal control firm-years are identified as 
those disclosing of material weakness in internal control in annual reports from August 
2002 to March 2006. The relation between weak internal controls and lower market-value 
holds after controlling for a 10K-only material weakness sample. Moreover, the results 
                                                  
13 I use the same set of determinants for MW . Estimation from the first-stage regression is shown in 
Appendix B. This arrangement supposes those MW  determinants can also be used to determine the 
voluntary disclosures of material weaknesses in annual report. 
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are robust to corrections for self-selection bias using both the inverse Mills ratio approach 
and propensity score matching.  
I also find that the negative relation between market-value and internal control 
is stronger when the internal control problems are related to more-than-reporting internal 
controls (MTRICs) versus reporting-only internal controls (FRICs).  
Finally, I conducted additional tests to further explore the market valuation of 
internal controls. First, I test whether market evaluates differently if weaknesses are 
related to different control components in COSO (1995). Second, I test whether repetitive 
weaknesses imply weak remediation measures and results into lower market valuation. 
Third, I test whether market concerns about the disclosures of weakness being postponed 
to amendments of 10Ks. Fourth, I test whether market favorably evaluate a voluntary 
disclosure of weaknesses in internal controls. Results for the last two additional tests are 
significant after correcting the self-selection bias. These results suggest market concerns 
about the disclosures of weak internal controls being delayed to amended 10Ks and 
market positively valuates the voluntary disclosures of weak internal controls.  
A potential limitation of this study is the use of the disclosure of a material 
weakness as the proxy for the underlying construct of having an internal control problem. 
Therefore, to the extent that there is a systematic bias in the choice to identify and 
 
 46
disclose material weaknesses, the sample in this study may not represent the true 
underlying population of internal control problem firms.  
Empirical findings here have implications for regulators, researchers, and 
practitioners. First, it appears that internal control is a fundamental driver for firm-value, 
but largely untestable prior to the introduction of SOX. Second, the research finding adds 
to the debate on the benefits of SOX, suggesting that the SOX’ s efforts to promote better 
internal controls can actually create firm value. Third, firm value can be further created if 
firms do not limit their internal controls for the objective of reporting reliability.   
 
 47
Chapter 3 Enterprise Risk Management and Firm Performance 
 
3.1  Introduction 
An argument growing throughout the existing literature in accounting and 
financial management is that the implementation of an enterprise risk management (ERM) 
system will improve firm performance (e.g., see COSO, 2004; Hoyt et al, 2006; Nocco 
and Stulz, 2006). There is, however, very limited empirical evidence confirming this 
relation between ERM and firm performance. Furthermore, the empirical evidence that 
does exist suggests that the appropriate ERM system may vary across firms (e.g., see 
PwC, 2004; Beasley et al. 2005; Hoyt et al, 2006). In other words, the relation between 
ERM and firm performance is most likely contingent upon several firm-related factors.  
The primary objective of the study reported in Chapter 3 is to empirically 
examine the argument that the relation between ERM and firm performance is contingent 
upon the appropriate match between a firm’ s ERM and the following five factors 
impacting the firm: environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm complexity, 
firm size, and monitoring by the firm’ s board of directors. This argument is examined 
based on an empirical study of 124 U.S. firms that disclose their ERM activities in their 
10K reports for 2005 with the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). The 
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findings from the study provide strong evidence that the relation between ERM and firm 
performance is contingent upon the appropriate match between a firm’ s ERM system and 
the five factors noted above.  
Firms have the choice of implementing an ERM system and, if they do, they can 
also decide whether to disclose any information about their ERM. Our results are robust 
to the correction of self-selection problem by using a propensity matched sample. 
Specifically, a probit regression model with ERM adoption as a function of its 
determinants is estimated for the calculation of the propensity score. Non-ERM firms in 
the same industry with the closest propensity scores are selected as the control group. A 
dummy variable is created to indicate whether a firm belongs to ERM group or control 
group. This dummy is then included in our analysis as a control variable to control for the 
self-selection of adopting and disclosing ERM. After controlling for the self-selecting 
problem, our results still support the argument that the relation between ERM and firm 
performance is contingent upon the appropriate match between a firm’ s ERM system and 
the five contingency factors.  
The remainder of Chapter 3 will proceed as follows. In the next section the basic 
hypothesis underlying the empirical study is developed. The design of the empirical study 
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to test this basic hypothesis is discussed in the third section of the paper. The fourth 
section discusses the results of the empirical study. The fifth section shows the robustness 
checks. The sixth, and final, section of the paper discusses the implications of the study 
and direction for future research.  
3.2  Basic Argument 
Enterprise risk management focuses on adopting a systematic and consistent 
approach to managing all of the risks confronting an organization. Indeed, ERM is 
considered by many as the fundamental paradigm for managing the portfolio of risks 
confronting organizations (e.g., see Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Beasley et al, 2005; 
O’ Donnell, 2005; Nocco and Stulz, 2006). From a managerial accounting perspective, 
ERM can be thought of as falling under the umbrella of the value-based management 
approach that provides an integrated framework for measuring and managing an 
organization, with the explicit objective of creating long-term value for the organization14. 
Gordon and Loeb (2006, p. 106) define ERM as follows:  
Enterprise risk management refers to the overall process of managing an 
organization’ s exposure to uncertainty with particular emphasis on identifying 
and managing the events that could potentially prevent the organization from 
achieving its objective. ERM is an organizational concept that applies to all levels 
of the organization. 
                                                  
14 See Ittner and Larcker (2001) for an excellent discussion of the value-based management philosophy.   
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The most popular definition of ERM in the accounting literature (e.g., see Beasley 
et al, 2005) is, however, the one provided by COSO (2004). According to COSO (2004, p. 
2), 
Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’ s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives. 
According to COSO (2004), the effectiveness of an organization’ s ERM needs to 
be judged in terms of the following four objectives.  
1. Strategy: high-level goals, aligned with and supporting its mission. 
2. Operations: effective and efficient use of its resources. 
3. Reporting: reliability of reporting. 
4. Compliance: compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  
The above definition and objectives of ERM provided by COSO (2004) are in 
large part, based on COSO’ s (1992) framework for internal control (IC). The one major 
difference is that COSO’ s notion of ERM includes a strategy element not included in its 
IC framework. Thus, when viewed in these terms, the objectives of ERM specified by 
COSO are clearly an extension of an organization’ s management control system. In 
developing the guidelines for implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, the 
original intent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was to take the broader 
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view of IC that parallels the IC framework provided by COSO (1992). However, the final 
version of SOX limits its IC requirement to COSO’ s notion of financial reporting 
reliability.15 This latter fact notwithstanding, most major corporations take the broader 
view of management control systems rather than the narrow IC view required by SOX. 
Thus, an unintended positive consequence of SOX is a move toward an ERM philosophy 
by many major corporations.  
In developing its ERM framework, COSO (2004) specifies eight components to 
achieve the attainment of the aforementioned four objectives: strategy, operations, 
reporting, and compliance. These eight components are: internal environment, objective 
setting, event identification, risk assessment, risk response, control activities, information 
and communication, and monitoring. The COSO framework points out that the role of 
these eight components will vary depending on the size of organization. In essence, 
COSO points out that the costs and benefits of an ERM system will vary from firm to 
firm, depending on the above components and the size of the firm. Thus, COSO’ s (2004) 
ERM framework clearly implies a contingency perspective toward the net benefits a firm 
will derive from its ERM system. In other words, the most cost effective ERM system for 
a particular firm may vary substantially from the ERM system that is cost-effective for 
                                                  
15 Section 302, 404, and 906, of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, provide the specific requirements related 
to an organization’ s internal control for firms filing with the SEC. 
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another firm. This view is, of course, consistent with the accounting literature that applies 
contingency theory to management control systems (e.g., Gordon and Miller, 1976; Otley, 
1980; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; Merchant, 1984; Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Mia 
and Chenhall, 1994; Shields, 1995; Chenhall, 2003).  
Not surprisingly, determining which factors are key in determining the 
contingency nature of a firm’ s ERM system and its performance is far from an exact 
science. However, based on the existing literature, it seems fair to assume that at least 
five factors are critical to understanding the relation between ERM and firm performance. 
These five factors are: environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, firm 
complexity, and monitoring by the firm’ s board of directors. The rationale underlying the 
importance of each of these factors is discussed below.  
3.2.1  Environmental Uncertainty 
The importance of considering the environmental uncertainty (EU) confronting an 
organization when designing management control systems (which include an ERM 
system) is well established in the accounting literature (e.g., see Gordon and Miller, 1976; 
Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; Chenhall, 2003). Environmental uncertainty creates 
difficulties in management control systems due to the fact that it creates increases in the 
unpredictability of future events. Thus, the risks confronting a firm and the appropriate 
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response to such risks will vary depending on the EU confronting the firm. Since an ERM 
system is intended to identify and manage future unpredictable events that may adversely 
affect an entity, as environmental uncertainty increases obstacles to cost-effective ERM 
activities may also increase. In addition, as environmental uncertainty increases, the need 
for incorporating broad scope information into an ERM control system will also likely 
increase (e.g., see Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; and Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Mia and 
Chenhall, 1994). Thus, the proper match between a firm’ s ERM and the EU confronting 
the firm is likely to impact the relation between a firm’ s ERM system and its overall 
performance (i.e., the net benefits and costs). Accordingly, the environmental uncertainty 
confronting a firm is one factor that is considered in the study reported upon in Chapter 3.  
3.2.2  Industry Competition 
Industry competition is another factor that seems critical when considering the 
relation between a firm’ s performance and its ERM system. Khandwalla (1972), for 
example, found that the sophistication of a firm’ s control (i.e., monitoring) system is 
highly correlated with the intensity of competition. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
proper match between industry competition and a firm’ s ERM system will have an effect 
on the relation between a firm’ s ERM system and performance. The evidence provided 
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by the PwC (2004) Survey supports this assumption. Accordingly, industry competition 
is another factor considered in the study reported upon in Chapter 3.  
3.2.3  Firm Size 
The relation between firm size and organizational structure has been a primary 
consideration in the organization theory literature for some time ( e.g., see Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). In addition, accounting researches have also found firm size an important 
factor when considering the design and use of management control system. Shields 
(1995), for example, finds large firms may have greater access to the resources needed to 
implement more complex systems. Hoyt et al (2006) find firm size to be positively 
related to the adoption of ERM. Beasley et al (2005) show that organizational size is 
positively related to the stage of ERM implementation. Merchant (1984) argues that 
organizational growth poses increased communication and control problems. 
Furthermore, as the size of a firm increases, the difficulty in implementing information 
and communication activities, as well as control activities, would also likely increase. 
Thus, the cost effectiveness of an ERM system is likely to vary with variations in firm 
size. In other words, the proper match between firm’ s size and its ERM system is likely 
to affect the relation between a firm’ s ERM and its performance. Accordingly, firm size 
is another factor that is considered in the study reported upon in Chapter 3.  
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3.2.4  Firm Complexity 
Another factor that is likely to impact the relation between a firm’ s ERM system and its 
performance is the notion of firm complexity. Firm complexity, as used in this paper, 
refer to the numbers of line-of-businesses and geographical locations associated with a 
firm. As pointed out by Merchant (1981), highly diversified and decentralized firms 
require more administrative controls than their less diversified and decentralized 
counterparts. Hoyt et al (2006) find that complexity (measured by industrial and 
international diversification) is positively related to the use of ERM. Greater firm 
complexity will, however, cause less integration of information and more difficulties in 
management control within the organization. Doyle et al (2005) find material weaknesses 
in internal control is more likely for firms that are more complex. Thus, the proper match 
between a firm’ s complexity and its ERM system is likely to be another key concern in 
assessing the relation between a firm’ s ERM and its performance. Accordingly, firm 
complexity is another factor considered in the study reported upon in Chapter 3.  
3.2.5  Board Monitoring 
Kleffner et al. (2003) found that many Canadian companies adopting an ERM 
strategy cited encouragement from the board of directors as the main factor underlying 
 
 56
such adoption. COSO (2004) also argues that the board of directors play an important 
role in a firm’ s ERM strategy. Beasley et al (2005) find the proportion of independent 
directors in the board is positively related to the stage of ERM deployment. In addition, 
starting 2003 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Corporate Governance Rules include 
explicit requirements for NYSE registrant audit committees to assume specific 
responsibilities with respect to “ risk assessment and risk management,”  including risks 
beyond financial reporting (NYSE, 2003).  Thus, the proper match between a firm’ s 
board of director’ s monitoring activities and its ERM strategy is likely to affect the 
relation between a firm’ s ERM and its performance. Accordingly, the monitoring 
activities of a firm’ s board of directors is another factor that is considered in the study 
reported upon in Chapter 3.  
The above discussion suggests that, from a performance perspective, a firm’ s 
choice of its ERM system should be properly matched with several key firm-related 
variables. That is, there is a cost associated with an ERM system and the costs of 
improving the effectiveness of such a system needs to be weighed against the incremental 
benefits. In terms of a basic argument, the above can be stated as follows.  
The relation between a firm’s ERM and its performance is contingent on the 
proper match between a firm’s ERM and the following five firm-related 
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variables: environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, firm 
complexity and monitoring by the firm’s board of directors.  
The above basic argument which is illustrated in Figure 3.1, can be tested in terms 
of equations (3.1) and (3.2) specified below. Equation (3.1) describes the relation 
between ERM and the firm related variables discussed above. Equation (3.2) considers 
the relation between a firm’ s performance and the appropriate “ match.”  Equation (3.2) is 
based on a residual analysis, whereby the absolute value of residuals (ARES) from 
equation (1) are regressed on firm performance.  
0 1 2 3 4 5ERM EU CI FS FC MBDβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + + ,                                 (3.1) 
               where ERM = enterprise risk management,  
                            EU = environmental uncertainty, 
                              CI = competition within industry, 
                              FS = firm size, 
                              FC = firm complexity, 
                           MBD = monitoring by firms board of directors,  
                                 iβ = various model parameters, i=0 to 5, and  
                                 ε  = error term. 
0 1P ARESβ β ε= + +                                                                                         (3.2) 
                              where P = firm performance,  
                                 ARES = absolute value of residuals from equation (1), 
                                        iβ = various model parameters, i=0 to 1, and  
                                        ε  = error term. 
The basic premise underlying the residual analysis model is that the residuals 
derived from equation (3.1) represent a “ lack of fit”  in the match between ERM and the 
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five firm related variables shown in that equation (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Duncan 
and Moores, 1989; Gordon and Smith, 1992)16,17. Thus, if the basic argument in this 
paper is correct, the absolute value of the residuals (i.e., lack of fit) in equation (3.1) 
should be negatively associated with firm performance in equation (3.2).  
3.3  Empirical Study 
3.3.1  Sample 
The sample used for this study was derived from the U.S. Security and Exchange 
Commission’ s EDGAR database. The study began with a search for companies that 
indicated they were utilizing the ERM concept in their 10Ks and 10Qs covering their 
fiscal year 2005. Following Hoyt et al (2006), firms were initially identified as using the 
ERM concept is based on a search of the following key terms: enterprise risk 
management, strategic risk management, corporate risk management, risk management 
committee, risk committee, and chief risk officer. The sentences that contain the key 
words were read to get a better sense of whether or not the ERM concept is actually being 
                                                  
16 The purpose of this study is to investigate the hypothesis that the match of ERM to firm related factors is 
significantly related to firm performance and not to provide an explanation of firm performance. The 
capital asset pricing model assumes that risk is the consistent predictor of (stock market) performance. 
Accordingly, since we adjust the performance measures for the risk adjusted market return (as discussed in 
the empirical study in the next section), a full model which explains performance is not necessary. 
17 As an alternative to residual analysis, an interactive specification of the model could be utilized. Such a 
model would hypothesize that performance is a function of ERM, the additional firm-related factors, and 
their interaction. Apart from the difficulties in interpreting these results with multiple firm related variables, 
Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) point out that interactive terms specifically model an acceleration effect on 
the dependent variable. We believe the residual analysis is a better test of the relationships being considered 
in this study.  
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used. Appendix 3.A provides three examples of firm’ s disclosures about their 
implementation of ERM. Those cases where firms are only implementing a partial risk 
management approach were eliminated from our sample. For example, in the case of 
searching the term “ risk committee,”  terms like “ foreign exchange risk committee,”  
“ operation risk committee,”  and “ financial risk committee”  often appeared and these 
cases were not considered as applying the full ERM concept. Those cases related to risk 
management service providers were also eliminated. Based on this keywords searching 
process, 273 firms were identified as having implemented the ERM in 2005. Of these 273 
firms, 159 were eliminated due to missing data. Most of the deleted firms are from 
banking industry (i.e., with 60 and 61 as the first two digits of SIC codes, according to 
the industry classification in Fama and French (1997)).18 Thus, a final sample of 114 (i.e., 
279-159) firms were used for the empirical analysis is reported in this paper, as listed in 
Appendix 3.B. This sample comes from 22 industries, with the utility industry having the 
largest percentage (i.e., 35.96 %) of firms (see Table 3.1).  
Literature related to the ERM and firm performance only provides empirical 
evidence of using a sample from a certain industry. For example, Tufano (1996), by using 
a sample of 48 firms in the North American gold mining industry, finds the lack of value 
                                                  
18 The construct of ERM index (ERMI) requires the data of Cash Flows from Operating Activities 
(Compustat #308) in Statement of Cash Flows. In Compustat this data item is not available for banks.  
 
 60
creating from corporate risk management. Mackay and Moeller (2007)’ s sample of 34 oil 
refiners shows that corporate risk management can add to firm value. Hoyt et al. (2006) 
uses 166 U.S. insurers to show ERM’ s relation to firm value. Although using a sample 
from the same industry helps control for regulatory and market variations across 
industries, literature casts very few insights on the impacts of industry related contingent 
factors (e.g., industry competition) on the relation between ERM and firm performance. 
In addition, industry specific evidence in the literature has the common problem of 
generalizing the results to other industries. The cross-industry study in Chapter 3 intends 
to consider industry related factors as well as providing more generalized evidence to 
complement the current literature.  
3.3.2  Measurement of Variables 
Firm performance: ERM focuses on the risk and return tradeoff. Thus, the excess market 
return is one way to measure firm performance because the market returns are risk-
adjusted. (see Kolodny et al, 1989; Gordon and Smith, 1992). More specifically, the 
excess market return will reflect the fact that higher performing firms will either have a 
higher return for a given level of risk or a lower risk level for a given return level. Thus, 
for the study reported in this paper, firm performance is measured by the one-year excess 
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stock market return to shareholders for 2005, as shown below in equation (3.3). 19 Data to 
measure the excess return is obtained from the Compustat. 
 [ ( )]i i f i m fP R R R Rβ= − + −                                                                            (3.3) 
where, iP = Performance for firm i, 
            iR = Return for firm i, 
            mR = Return for the market, 
            fR = Risk free rate of return, and 
            iβ =Beta for the firm i.20 
Environmental uncertainty (EU): Environmental uncertainty (EU) is defined as the 
change or variability in the organization’ s external environment. Following Kren (1992), 
environmental uncertainty is measured as the combination of the following three 
surrogates metrics: (1) Market - Coefficient of variation of sales (Compustat #12), (2) 
Technological -Coefficient of variation of the sum of R&D (Compustat #46) and capital 
expenditures (Compustat #128) divided by total assets (Compustat #6), and (3) Income - 
                                                  
19 A one year total stock return could be used as an alternative firm performance measure due to the 
problems of using excess stock market returns (e.g., see Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997). 
We also considered this measure of performance. The results from using a one year total stock return are 
similar to using an excess return as the performance measure and therefore are not reported in this paper.   
20 The return to the market ( mR ) is estimated as the one-year return to investors for S&P 500. While this 
overstates the market return, the overstatement is consistent across firms and provides a more conservative 
measure of excess performance. The risk free rate ( fR ) is calculated as the 5-year U.S. government notes. 
Betas ( iβ ) were measured as the 5-year sensitivity of a company's stock price to the overall fluctuation in 
the S&P 500 Index Price. More specifically, beta is the iβ  derived from the following market model: 
i i i m iR Rα β ε= + + , where iR  is the return on firm i’ s security; mR  is the S&P 500 Index; iβ  is the 
systematic risk of firm i’ s security, equals to ( , ) / ( )j m mCOV R R VAR R ; iα is a constant; and iε is the 
error term (see Sharpe, 1963). 
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Coefficient of variation of net income before taxes (Compustat #170). For each firm, 
providing the data is available for five years, the coefficient of variation is calculated 
over the 2000-2005 period based on first differences of all surrogates21.  The composite 
measure of EU, and the individual coefficients are computed as shown in equation (3.4) 
below.   
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 k = 1 to 3 to represent market, technological or income uncertainty, and  
                   kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty surrogate k. 
The absolute value of kz  is used as the denominator of ( )kCV X  to avoid the case 
where a negative kz  results into negative ( )kCV X  and turns an uncertainty situation into 
a certainty situation.  
Competition within Industry (CI): Industry competition is measured as one minus 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (1- HHI). The HHI represents the sum of squared market 
                                                  
21 First differences were used because they provide a better measure of discontinuities, as pointed out by 
Bourgeois (1985). 
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shares of all firms in the market. The HHI measures the industry concentration and less 
concentration means more competition. I define market share as each firm’ s sales 
(Compustat #12) divided by the total sales of the industry. An industry is defined as all 
active Compustat firms with the same first two SIC code. The HHI is generally 
considered to be a better measure of competition intensity than a four-firm concentration 
ratio or the number of firms in the market because HHI combines information about the 
number of firms in a market and their size distribution (Krishnan, 2005b).  
Firm complexity (FC): Firm complexity is measured by counting the number of business 
segments (from Compustat Segments) for each firm. More business segments will 
increase the firm’ s complexity. For firms with missing data about business segments, I 
hand-collect information from 10-K files.  
Firm size (FS): Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets 
(Compustat #6). Market-value is not chosen to measure firm size because firm 
performance has been measured using the information about stock prices. This metric for 
size is commonly used in accounting studies (e.g., Francis et al. 2004) 
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Monitoring by Board of Director (MBD): Board monitoring is measured by the number 
of directors for each firm divided by the natural logarithm of sales ((number of directors)/ 
log( )sales ). In general, more directors suggest more monitoring power from the board. 
However, larger firms usually have more directors than smaller firms. Thus, dividing the 
number of directors by the log( )sales  adjusts for this scale effect.22 Data for this variable 
was hand collected from the 2005 10-K files of firms. I also investigated the number of 
board meetings in a year as an alternative measure for board monitoring and results from 
using this alternative measure are provided as a robustness check in Section 3.5.  
ERM Index (ERMI): Discussions of ERM are generally devoid of any specifics on how to 
quantitatively measure the concept. Accordingly, we developed an ERM Index (ERMI) 
for measuring the effectiveness of ERM used in equation (3.1). The Index is based on 
COSO’ s four objectives. In other words, we developed an index of the effectiveness of an 
organization’ s ERM based on its ability to achieve its objectives relative to strategy, 
operations, reporting, and compliance. The basic goal of the ERMI is to sum up the 
achievement of the above four objectives. Two indicators are used for measuring the 
                                                  
22 Sales, instead of the firm’ s assets, are chosen for this scale effect because assets have been used for 
measuring the firm size. 
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achievement of each objective. ERMI is then constructed by summing up all eight 
indicators for the above four objectives, as equation (3.5) shows.  
ERMI = 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ +∑
=
2
1k
kOperation +
2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ +∑
=
2
1k
kCompliance        (3.5) 
Each indicator is standardized among the sample of 114 ERM firms before being 
combined in equation (3.5). The definition and related data for each indicator is explained 
below. Whenever the industry is mentioned, the industry is measured as all active firms 
with the same two digits SIC code in Compustat.  
Strategy: Strategy refers to the way a firm positions itself in the market place relative to 
its competition. In executing its strategy, a firm tries to develop a competitive advantage 
over competitors in the same industry. All firms in the same industry compete for the 
limited sales opportunities in the same market. Thus, more sales by firm i relative to the 
industry average sales means that firm i is outperforming its average competitors. Hence 
a measure of whether or not a firm had a success of strategy is the number of standard 
deviations its sales (Compustat #12) deviates from the industry sales, as shown below.  
1Strategy =
i Sales
Sales
Sales µ
σ
−
 
where iSales =Sales of firm i in 2005, 
            Salesµ =  average industry sales in 2005, and 
            Salesσ = standard deviation of sales of all firms in the same industry.  
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The second measure for strategic success is a firm’ s competitive advantage within 
industry in reducing systematic risks. One major benefit of implementing ERM is to 
diversify away risks by managing a portfolio of risks arising from all sources (Cummins, 
1976; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2006; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; Schramm and Sherman, 1974; 
and Tufano, 1996). ERM can therefore be deemed as firms applying diversification 
strategy on managing risks. Thompson (1984) measures the performance of 
diversification strategy by the reduction in systematic risk, or beta. The rationale behind 
this measure is that the systematic risk from market model describes a firm’ s 
undiversified risk, and a more successful diversification strategy can diversify more risks 
to reduce undiversified risk by managing firm’ s risk portfolio. The second measure of 
strategic success is therefore a firm’ s reduction in beta risks, relative to the other firms in 
the same industry.  
        2Strategy =
i β
β
β µ
σ
∆
∆
∆ −
 
where  iβ∆ = - ( iβ  in 2005 - iβ  in 2004), 
            iβ = firm i ‘s beta (data from Compustat).  
            βµ∆ = average industry β∆  in 2005, and 
            βσ ∆ = standard deviation of β∆ ’ s of all firms in the same industry. 
Operating Efficiency: Operating efficiency (or operating productivity) can be measured 
as the input-output relationship in the process of a firm’ s operation (Banker et al, 1989). 
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More output for a given level of input or less input for a given level of output means 
better operating efficiency. Thus, the turnover of assets, defined as sales (Compustat #12) 
over total assets (Compustat #6), is one measure for operating efficiency (Kiymaz, 2006), 
as shown below.  
1Operation =(Sales)/(Total Assets)  
Another measure of operating effectiveness is to define the input-output 
efficiency from operations by dividing sales (Compustat #12) by number of employees 
(Compustat #29), as shown below.  
2Operation = Sales/ (Number of Employees) 
Reporting Reliability:23 Illegal earnings management, financial restatements, and 
financial fraud all inhibit the attainment of reliable financial reports. In fact, these 
practices have been used as evidence of poor financial reporting (Cohen et al, 2004). 
Thus, one measure for low reporting reliability is the combination of the following three 
readily observed variables: Material Weakness, Auditor Opinion, and Restatement. Firms 
are mandated to disclose any material weakness of internal control in financial reporting 
                                                  
23 FASB’ s SFAC No. 2 paragraph 59 states “ the reliability of a measure rests on the faithfulness with which 
it represents what it purports to represents, coupled with an assurance for the user, which comes through 
verification, that it has representational quality” . Reporting reliability covers only the representational 
dimension of the reporting quality. Our ERMI focuses on the reliability of financial reporting following 
COSO ERM’ s definition of reporting objectives.  
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following the requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. If a firm discloses any 
material weakness in its annual report, the variable Material Weakness is set to -1, 
otherwise is set to 0. Auditors express their opinion about a firm’ s financial reporting in 
their auditors’  report. Firms with unqualified opinions in their auditor’ s report have the 
variable Auditor Opinion set equal to 0, otherwise it is set to -1. The data about Material 
Weakness and Auditor Opinion is hand collected from 2005 annual reports in EDGAR 
database. The restatement of a firm’ s financial statements is viewed as a reduction of a 
firm’ s reporting reliability. The GAO (2006) provides a database containing a firms’  
announcements of financial restatements. If a firm announced a restatement in 2005, the 
variable Restatement is set to -1, otherwise it is set to 0. The range for Reporting1 is 
therefore from -3 to 0. 
Reporting1 = (Material Weakness)+(Auditor Opinion)+(Restatement) 
The absolute value of abnormal accruals has also been used to measure poor 
financial reporting quality (Johnson et al, 2002).24 Thus, a second measure of a firm’ s 
reporting Reliability used in this study reported in this paper is the relative proportion of 
the absolute value of normal accruals divided by the sum of the absolute value of normal 
                                                  
24 Johnson et al (2002) page 644 discusses the use of absolute value depends on whether there is a priori 
expectation regarding the direction of managerial incentives. The measurement of reporting reliability in 
this study is not related to directional management incentives. Therefore the absolute value is used.  
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and abnormal accruals.25 Absolute values are used because both normal accruals and 
abnormal accruals could be negative and their relative strength could be better measured 
by using their absolute values.   
The abnormal accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) accruals 
estimation model, as described in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Defond and 
Subramanyam (1997). In this model normal accruals are estimated as a function of the 
change in revenue (Compustat #12) and the level of property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat #8). These variables control for changes in accruals that are due to changes in 
the firm’ s economic condition. Total assets (Compustat #6) at the beginning of the year 
are used as the deflator for all variables in the model. The abnormal accruals are 
estimated from equation (3.6) below. 
1 1 1 1 2 1/ [1/ ] [ / ] [ / ]ijt ijt jt ijt jt ijt ijt jt ijt ijt ijtTA A A REV A PPE A eα β β− − − −= + ∆ + +             (3.6) 
     where  t = year 2005, 
           ijtTA = total accruals for firm i in industry j, 
          1ijtA − = total assets for firm i in industry j, 
     ijtREV∆ = change in net revenues for firm i in industry j, 
       ijtPPE = gross property plant and equipment for firm i in industry j, and 
             ijte = error term for firm i in industry j. 
                                                  
25 As summarized by Johnson et al (2002) that, in the literature, the focus is usually on abnormal accruals, 
which measures how poor is the reporting reliability. Thus the common measure is 
( )AbnormalAccruals NormalAccruals AbnormalAccruals+ .  This study intends to measure 
how good is the reporting reliability. Therefore, we place the normal accruals in the nominator of our 
measure ( )NormalAccruals NormalAccruals AbnormalAccruals+ .  
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Total accruals are defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) 
minus operating cash flows (Compustat #308). Industry-specific estimates are obtained 
from the coefficients from the ordinary least squares of equation (3.6). The variable for 
abnormal accruals (i.e., AbnormalAccruals) is the error term from the regression model 
shown in equation (3.6). The variable normal accruals (i.e., NormalAccruals) is defined 
as Total accruals minus AbnormalAccruals). Reporting2 is then measured as the 
following:  
Reporting2 =
NormalAccruals
NormalAccruals AbnormalAccruals+
 
Compliance Effort: O’ keefe et al (1994) found compliance with Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standard (GAAS) increases with audit fees. Thus, the first measure of 
compliance effort used in the study reported in this paper is the proportion of auditor’ s 
fees to net sales revenue (Compustat #12). Auditor’ s fees are paid mainly for the services 
derived from auditing financial statements, certification, examining individual and 
consolidated accounts, due-diligence reviews, agreed-upon procedures (e.g., confirming 
compliance with specific contractual agreements), and tax compliance and consultancy. 
The data for auditor’ s fees (AuditorFees) are collected from proxy statements and scaled 
by total assets (Compustat #6). 
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1Compliance  =
 
 
Auditor Fees
Total Assets
 
If firms put more effort into regulation compliance, it seems reasonable to expect 
that they will have less settlement losses and more settlement gains. Thus, the second 
measure of compliance effort used in the study reported upon in this paper is settlement 
gain (loss) (Compustat #372)26 over total assets (Compustat #6). 
2Compliance =  
Settlement Net Gain
Total Assets
 
The definition for ERMI is summarized in Appendix 3.D. 
3.3.3  Testing Method 
The discussion about the importance of contingency variables to ERM in Section 
II of this paper indicates that the enterprise risk management index (ERMI) is contingent 
on the proper match between environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, 
firm complexity, and board monitoring. Following Gordon and Smith (1992) we derive 
the functional relation between the ERMI index calculated from equation (3.5) and these 
five contingency factors for the high performing firms, where high performing firms are 
defined as those with an excess return greater than 2%.27 The coefficients for the five 
                                                  
26 Compustat #372 is the sum of all settlement special items reported before taxes, including: 1) provisions 
to boost reserves for litigation and settlements, 2) insurance recovery and proceeds, and 3) reversal of 
reserve for litigation and settlements. Net settlement income (gains) is positive and net settlement expense 
(losses) is negative.  This data item excludes settlements relating to pension plans.   
27 We also try other cut-offs of excess returns for the high performing firms. This sensitivity test is shown 
in our robustness check in Section V.  
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contingency factors are derived based on the high performing firms. In essence, the high 
performing firms are used as the benchmark group, such that the relation between ERM 
and the five contingency variables derived from these firms is viewed as an “ ideal”  or 
“ best practice”  ERM-contingency model. Equation (3.7) is used to estimate this relation 
for high performing firms.  
  0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBDβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +                                        (3.7) 
The coefficients derive from the high performing group represent the proposed 
“ best practice”  model, as in equation (3.8).  
      
0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBDβ β β β β β= + + + + +                                             (3.8)                                      
Instead of focusing on individual contingency variable, this proposed “ best 
practice”  model emphasizes the holistic perspective concerning the way all contingencies 
variables are related to ERM. Firms following this “ best practice”  model will presumably 
show higher performance than those that follow a different model.  
To test the basic argument, residual analysis is used. Residual analysis has the 
advantage of using the holistic concept of fit by simultaneously including internal 
controls, contextual variables, and firm performance (Duncan and Moores, 1989). For all 
firms, the absolute value of the residuals (ARES) is calculated by applying the derived 
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coefficients from high performing firms in equation (3.8). The ARES variable measures 
the deviation from the proposed best fit determined by high performing firms. That is, 

i i iARES ERMI ERMI= −                                                                                   (3.9) 
The relationship between ARES and firm performance can then be tested by the 
following model.  
0 1i i iP ARESβ β ε= + +                                                                                          (3.10) 
In equation (3.10), ARES is expected to be negatively related to the firm 
performance (i.e. 1β  in equation (3.10) is expected to be negative). The reason for this 
expectation is that ARES measures the deviation from the “ best practice”  (or best fit) in 
terms of matching from the firm’ s ERM and the contingency variables (e.g., see Drazin 
and Van de Ven, 1985).  
3.4. Empirical Results 
3.4.1  Summary Statistics and Univariate Test 
I selected high performing firms as those firms with a one year excess return 
greater than 2%, following Gordon and Smith (1992). Summary statistics for the total 
sample, high performing firms, and the other firms are provided in Table 3.2. Based on 
the cutoff of 2% one year excess return, there are 54 high performing firms in our sample. 
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The average ERMI for the high performing group is -0.073, as compared to 0.066 for the 
remaining firms. However, these two groups are not statistically different in their means 
of ERMI (test of difference in means shows p-value 0.776). In addition, all five 
contingency variables of the high performing group of firms and the other firms are not 
statistically different in means. These results from univariate test indicate that ERMI and 
the five contingency variables, by themselves, do not account for high performance. 
Table 3.3 provides the Spearman and Pearson correlation analysis for all 114 
firms. Among the dependent variables in regression model (3.7) (i.e., EU, CI, FC, FS, 
and MBD), MBD is highly correlated with EU (Pearson correlation coefficient 0.219 with 
p-value 0.019) and FS (Pearson correlation coefficient –0.454 with p-value <0.001). 
These strong correlations suggest the possibility of multicollinearity in estimating model 
(3.7). Given this potential multicollinearity problem suggested by our correlation analysis, 
we will check the Variance Inflation Factor (or VIF) and Tolerance along with our 
analysis of model (3.7).28  
                                                  
28 The Tolerance is the proportion of variance in a given predictor that is not explained by all of the other 
predictors, while the VIF is simply 1 / tolerance. The VIF represents a factor by which the variance of the 
estimated coefficient is multiplied due to the multicollinearity in the model. Values of VIF exceeding 10 
and Tolerance less than 0.1 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity (Ayyangar, 2007, page 5) 
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3.4.2  Main Results 
Results from regression model (3.7) for the total sample and each group are shown 
in Panel A in Table 3.4. For the group of high performing firms, four of the contingency 
variables (i.e., industry competition, firm complexity, firm size and board monitoring) 
have a significant effect on the effectiveness of ERM. The one exception is for 
environmental uncertainty. Conversely, for the other firms (i.e., the firms which are not 
the high performers), none of the contingency variable shows significant effect on ERM. 
Since contextual factors are usually exogenous variables, this result suggests high 
performing firms are taking contingency variables more seriously than the other firms in 
their implementation of ERM. The other finding from Table 3.4 Panel A is that, for all 
regressors, VIFs are very low and Tolerances are very high, indicating no concern about 
the problem of multicollinearity in our regression analysis.  
In Table 3.4, the coefficients derived from the group of high performing firms 
will be the proposed proper match between ERM and the contingency variables. In other 
words, all coefficients in equation (3.8) should be replaced by the coefficients from high 
performing group in Table 3.4, as the following equation. 
 20.626 - 0.217 - 12.707 2.283 - 0.372 - 2.977 i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBD= −        (3.11) 
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According to the basic argument, if all firms choose the ideal match between their 
ERM and the contingency variables based on the specification in equation (3.11), they 
will have a greater chance of having high performance. In order to test this hypothesis, I 
need to test whether more deviation of a firm’ s ERMI from ERMI  will result in lower 
firm performance. Firm performance is then regressed on i i iARES ERMI ERMI= −  for 
all firms, as shown in regression equation (3.10). The results of this residual analysis are 
shown in Table 3.4 Panel B.  
As hypothesized, the coefficient of ARES  (-3.221) is significantly negative at the 
significant level of 0.05 (see Table 3.5). In other words, a greater deviation from the 
proposed match will result in a larger ARES , and ARES  is negatively associated with 
firm performance. Thus, the results in Table 3.4 Panel B support the main hypothesis that 
the proper match between ERM and the contingency variables is a key driver of firm 
performance. The importance of this proper match for firm performance is strengthened 
if we recall the results in Table 3.2, where neither the ERMI nor the contingency 
variables by themselves show a significant difference between the high performing group 
of firms and the other firms.  
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3.5. Robustness Checks 
3.5.1  Propensity Matched Sample 
The propensity matched sample is created for two robustness checks. First, firms 
might choose to implement ERM or disclose ERM (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2006). Some 
of the factors that are correlated with firm’ s choice to adopt ERM may also be correlated 
with the observed effectiveness of ERM (i.e., the variable ERMI) and firm performance 
(i.e., the variable P). With the propensity matched sample, I can check whether our 
results in main analysis are robust to adding 114 non-ERM firms with the same 
propensity of adopting ERM. I can also control for this self-selection choice by including 
to our model (3.7) one more indicating variable about whether a firm is implementing 
ERM sample. In other words, I control for firm’ s self-selection of ERM in developing our 
proposed proper match between ERM and contingency variables, which supplies the 
residual analysis with the residuals (and ARES) that have been corrected for the self-
selection problem.  
Second, I can use the propensity matched sample to check whether our ERMI, 
defined as the extent of achieving the four objectives in COSO ERM (2004), is a valid 
measure for the effectiveness of firm’ s ERM. If ERM firms’  main pursuit is the four 
objectives in COSO ERM (2004) and our construct of ERMI in equation (5) properly 
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measures the achievement of those objectives, after controlling for the propensity of 
adopting ERM, ERM sample should be expected to have higher ERMI than non-ERM 
control sample.  
The propensity matched sample is created by matching our 114 ERM firms with 
114 non-ERM same-industry firms having the closest propensity scores of implementing 
ERM.29 The propensity scores are the predicted probabilities from the following probit 
regression that estimates the likelihood of adopting ERM.  
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
( 1)  
                                
i i i i i
i i i
Prob ERM Big4 FS ZScore DE Ratio
Investment Opportunity Foreign Transaction
β β β β β
β β ε
= = + + + +
+ + +
    (3.12) 
The variables in (3.12) are explained as follows. We use a dummy variable iERM  
to indicate whether firm i engages in ERM ( 1iERM = ) or did not engage in ERM 
( 1iERM = ) at any point during 2005. I select the six determinants in probit regression by 
consulting the literature related to the determinants of ERM (Beasley et al. 2005; Dionne 
and Triki, 2003; Hoyt and Liebenbert, 2006; and Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). iBig4  is a 
dummy variable and is set to one if firm i’ s auditor is from big four CPA firms, or set to 
zero otherwise. iFS  stands for firm size and is measured as the logarithm of firm i’ s total 
assets (Compustat #6). iZScore  is the Z-score developed by Altman (1968) to proxy for 
firm i’ s financial distress.   iDE Ratio  is to divide total debt (Compustat #9 + 
                                                  
29 Same industry firms are firms with the same first two digits SIC codes.  
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Compustat#34) by stockholder’ s equity (Compustat #216) to measure firm i’ s financial 
leverage.  iInvestment Opportunity  is to proxy for firm i’ s investment opportunities by 
the sum of capital expenditure (Compustat #128) and R&D expenditures (Compustat #46) 
scaled by firm’ s total assets.  iForeign Transaction  in an international diversification 
dummy takes on a value of one if firm i has none zero foreign currency adjustment 
(Compustat #150) in 2005, and zero otherwise. 0β  through 6β  are estimation coefficients. 
iε  is the error term. Data for all six determinants in (3.12) are from Compustat.  
We estimate the probit regression model (3.12) using 244 ERM firms and 7,232 
firms in the Compustat with available data and never disclosing any ERM in their 2005 
filings. The results are presented in Appendix 3.C. The propensity scores, or the predicted 
probabilities from the above probit model, are then used to match our 114 ERM sample 
with non-ERM firms in the same industry with the closest propensity scores. This method, 
known as propensity score matching (LaLonde, 1986), creates a non-ERM control 
sample of 114 firms with the same predicted probabilities of adopting ERM.  
Table 3.5 Panel A shows the univariate test for the difference between the ERM 
and none-ERM firms. None of performance (P), ERMI, and five contingency variables 
show significant difference between the two groups. Notably, the mean of ERMI for 
ERM group (0.271) is higher than that for none-ERM group (-0.271), but their difference 
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(0.541) is only close to the significant level (p-value=0.124). Basic evidence from 
univariate test suggests our ERMI might be a fair yet not perfect index for measuring the 
effectiveness of ERM.  
In order to control for firm’ s self-selection of ERM, I use the 112 high performing 
firms of 228 propensity matched firms (i.e., 114 ERM firms and 114 non-ERM firms) to 
develop the proposed proper match, where the high performing firm is defined the same 
as in our main analysis in Section IV. I also modify our model (3.7) by adding one more 
control variable iERM , as the following equation shows.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 5i i i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBD ERMβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +                      (3.13) 
The results for (3.13) are shown in Table 3.5 Panel B. Some coefficients of the 
contingency variables are not as significant as in our main analysis in Section 3.4. This 
weakened result could be because we include non-ERM firms into our analysis, and non-
ERM firms in fact neither implement ERM nor consider contingency variables for ERM. 
However, we want to analyze the coefficients of iERM  to check the validity of our ERMI 
construct. The coefficients of iERM  are consistently positive: 0.591, 0.324, and 0.7 for 
total sample, high performing firms, and the other firms, respectively. Only the 
coefficient of iERM  for the total sample is significant at 10% level (p-value 0.09). This 
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result confirms the evidence from our univariate test that our ERMI is a fair, yet not 
perfect, measure for the effectiveness of ERM.  
The coefficients for high performing group in Table 3.5, Panel B represent the 
proposed proper match between ERM and contingency variables and are used for residual 
analysis, as shown in Table 3.5 Panel C.  The coefficient of ARES is significantly 
negative, suggesting that deviations from the proposed proper match are negatively 
related to firm performance. Therefore, after correcting the self-selection bias, the 
empirical evidence still supports our basic argument that the relation between ERM and 
firm performance is contingent on the proper match between ERM and contingency 
variables.  
3.5.2  Different Cutoffs for High Performing Firms 
The main analysis in this study picks up the cutoff of 2% one year excess return 
for high performing firms to follow the literature (Gordon and Smith, 1992). I also tried 
different cutoffs for high performing firms to address the concern that our main analysis 
might be sensitive to the change of the cutoffs for high performing firms. Specifically, I 
used the cutoffs from 0% to 10% one year excess return. The lowest cutoff checked is 0% 
one-year excess return because, intuitively, we do not define firms with a negative excess 
return as having high performance. The highest cutoff tested is 10% one year excess 
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return because, beyond 10%, the number of high-performing firms will be reduced to less 
than 33 and will result in a low power of test.  
Table 3.6 shows the results under the different cutoffs of high performing firms. 
Besides EU, the coefficients for the other four contingency variables are always 
significant although this significance is decreasing as we increase the percentage of 
cutoffs. However, the residual analysis consistently shows negative coefficients for ARES, 
with significance levels between p-values 0.021 and 0.039. This robustness check shows 
that the results in the main analysis in Section 3.4 are not sensitive to the changes of the 
cutoffs for high performing firms  
3.5.3  Alternative Measure for the Monitoring by Board of Directors 
In the main analysis in Section 3.4, I measure the monitoring by board of directors 
(i.e., the contingency variable iMBD ) as the number of directors. However, Vafeas (1999) 
uses the frequency of board meetings to measure the monitoring from the board and has 
shown significant impact on firm performance. Therefore, I also used the number of 
board meetings in 2005 as an alternative measure for the monitoring by the board. The 
data for the number of board meetings is obtained from Compustat Executive 
Compensation.  
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As in Table 3.7 Panel A, the number of ERM firms is greatly reduced when I use 
the alternative measure for iMBD  because Compustat Executive Compensation only 
contains data for around 2,500 firms. There are only 30 high performing firms available 
for developing the proposed proper match. Notwithstanding the reduction in sample size, 
Table 3.7 Panel B still shows significant and negative coefficient of ARES (coefficient -
7.019 and p-value 0.005), supporting the basic argument that the relation between ERM 
and firm performance is contingent on the proper match between ERM and contingent 
variables.  
3.5.4  Alternative Timing of Excess Returns 
One concern regarding our main analysis is the use of one year excess returns 
based on the end of 2005. This concern stems from the fact that annual reports and 
related financial information are not usually available to the market until three months 
after the end of the year. To address this concern, I changed the timing of one year excess 
returns to three months after the end of the year.30 Based on this new timing of excess 
returns, the high performing group of firms (i.e., those with an excess return greater than 
2%) now includes 70 firms.  
                                                  
30 A one year return ending three months after the end of year was also considered. The results are very 
similar to the results using a one-year excess return and are therefore not reported.  
 
 84
The results from regressing the ERMI on the contingency variables are shown in 
Table 3.8, Panel B. All five contingency variables for high performing firms have lower 
p-values than the other group of firms, suggesting that high performing firms are more 
concerned with the proper match between their ERM and contingency variables than the 
other groups of firms.  
From Table 3.8, Panel A, the proposed proper match derived from the high 
performing group of firms is now derived from the following equation (3.14).  
 18.819 -0.204 - 11.845 -0.551 - 0.282 - 3.518 i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBD=           (3.14) 
Equation (3.14) is then applied to all 114 firms in the sample for the residual 
analysis and the results can be found in Table 3.8, Panel B.  
The coefficient of the ARES shown in Table 3.8, Panel B, is significantly negative 
at a level of 0.05. This result is consistent with the main analysis (see Table 3.4) about the 
existence of the proper match. That is, a greater deviation from the proposed match 
between ERM and the contingency variables (Model (3.14)) is associated with lower firm 
performance.  
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3.6  Concluding Comments  
Using a sample of 114 firms disclosing the implementation of enterprise risk 
management (ERM) in their 2005 annual reports, the study in Chapter 3 reports on an 
empirical study that investigates whether the relation between ERM and firm 
performance is contingent upon the proper match between the ERM and five key 
contingency variables. The findings from this study confirm the argument that the ERM-
firm performance relation is indeed contingent on the proper match between ERM and 
the following five variables: environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, 
firm complexity, and monitoring by the board of directors. This finding is robust, even 
when I correct for the self-selection bias, choose different cutoffs of high performing 
firms, use alternative measure for board monitoring, and consider an alternative timing 
for firm performance.  
The intuitive and obvious findings in our analysis suggests that our ERM Index 
(ERMI), constructed from some general indicators based on COSO’ s concept of  ERM 
(2004), are in the right direction to measure the effectiveness of ERM. By using a 
propensity matched sample, the validity of our ERMI is also found to be a fair, although 
not perfect, measure for the effectiveness of ERM. 
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As with most empirical studies in the social sciences, there are limitations to this 
study. Thus, since this is the first study of its kind (at least to our knowledge), the 
findings should be interpreted as preliminary rather than definitive. The limitations to this 
study include the following. This study only covers year 2005. Therefore the findings in 
this study might be hard to be generalized to other time periods. Another limitation of this 
study relates to that fact that I use a one-year excess return to measure firm performance. 
Other measures of performance (e.g., Tobin’ s Q or a five-year excess returns) could also 
be considered.  
The above limitations notwithstanding, I believe that the results of the study 
reported in this paper provide important insight into the relation between ERM and firm 
performance. In essence, these results show that the net benefits that firms will derive 
from implementing an ERM system are contingent on key variables surrounding the 
firms. 
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Chapter 4 Summary and Discussion 
 
This dissertation investigates two research questions arising from SOX’ s 
regulatory requirements on internal controls.  
As presented in Chapter 2, with respect to the research question about the relation 
between internal controls and firm performance, I use the residual income model as the 
market valuation model to examine the relation between market-value and firms with 
weak internal controls. The findings show that weak internal controls have lower market-
value. Firms with weak internal controls are identified as firm-years that disclose material 
weaknesses in internal control in annual reports from August 2002 to March 2006. The 
negative relation between week internal control and market-value is robust to the control 
for a 10K-only material weakness sample. This result is also robust to the correction for 
self-selection bias, using both the inverse Mills ratio approach and propensity score 
matching. In order to further explore the relation between internal control and firm 
performance, I also test and find that the negative relation between market-value and 
internal control deficiencies is stronger when the internal control problems are related to 
more-than-reporting internal controls (MTRICs), than reporting-only internal controls 
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(FRICs). Based on the above findings, I answer the first research question by concluding 
that better internal control implies better firm performance. These findings provide 
support for the SOX’ s efforts to promote better internal controls. Another insight from 
this study is that firm value can be further created if firms do not limit their design and 
implementation of internal controls to the objective of reporting reliability.  
The study in Chapter 3 addresses the second research question regarding the 
contingency view on ERM and firm performance. This chapter addresses the question 
concerning the proper match between ERM and contingency variables. Using a sample of 
114 firms disclosing the implementation of ERM in their 2005 10Ks and 10Qs, the 
empirical study investigates whether the relation between ERM and firm performance is 
contingent on the proper match between ERM and five key contingency variables: 
environment uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, firm complexity, and 
monitoring by the firm’ s board of directors. High performing firms are defined as those 
with greater than 2% one year excess return and are used to form the proposed proper 
match. An ERM index (ERMI) is constructed based on COSO ERM’ s (2004) definition 
of four objectives: strategy, operation, reporting, and compliance. The contingency view 
is supported by the empirical evidence, since the deviation from the proposed proper 
match is found to be negatively related to firm performance. This finding is robust to 
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checks for the correction of self-selection bias, different cutoffs for the definition of high 
performing firms, alternative measure for board monitoring, and alternative timing to 
measure firm performance. The empirical findings provided in Chapter 3 support the 
contingency argument concerning the relation between firm performance and ERM. Thus, 
firms that pursue business success building on all the compliance efforts for SOX are 
advised to refer to the proper match (or sometimes called the “ best practice” ) between 
their implementation of ERM and environmental factors.  
 Based on this dissertation, at least two extensions might be possible for future research. 
First, future study might want to explore whether the implementation of ERM enhances 
firm’ s internal controls. One of the motivations for this dissertation is that sound internal 
control system rests on the analysis and management of enterprise-wide risks. Although 
the empirical evidence in this dissertation shows that both internal control and ERM are 
related to firm performance, the relation between internal control and ERM remains 
unclear and should be further investigated. Second, as an extension from the research in 
Chapter 2, future study may explore the relation between internal control and firm 
performance by comparing one firm’ s performance before and after the disclosure of 
material weaknesses in internal control, instead of comparing material-weaknesses and 
non-material-weaknesses firms as the current study in Chapter 2.  
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Appendix 2.A Classification of FRIC and MTRIC Related Material Weaknesses  
Material Weaknesses in Reporting-Only Internal Controls (FRICs) 
 Account and transaction specific financial reporting weaknesses 
 Weaknesses in financial reporting procedures 
 Financial reporting specific personnel weaknesses 
Material Weaknesses in More-Than-Reporing Internal Controls (MTRICs) 
 Override by senior management  
 Control environment weaknesses 
 Lack of competent staff 
 Lack of training for personnel 
 Control system or IT system weaknesses 
 Weaknesses in Compliance with Tax Laws 
 
Examples of Material Weaknesses in Reporting-Only Internal Controls 
AMCON Distributing Corp. 
The Company's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer concluded that a 
material weakness existed in the Company's disclosure controls and procedures with 
respect to the application of accounting guidance contained in certain Emerging Issues 
Task Force Applications ("EITF's") and other accounting standards relating to the 
Company's recent financing transactions. 
General Electric Corp. 
We identified the following material weakness in our internal control over financial 
reporting with respect to accounting for hedge transactions: a failure to ensure the correct 
application of SFAS 133 when certain derivative transactions were entered into at GECC 
prior to August 2003 and failure to correct that error subsequently.  
     
Examples of Material Weaknesses in More-Than-Reporing Internal Controls 
Hollinger International Inc. 
The Company’ s management concluded that the following material weaknesses in the 
Company’ s internal control and ineffectiveness in the design and operation of the 
Company’ s disclosure controls and procedures, among others, existed during the year 
ended or as of December 31, 2003: 
• The “ tone from the top”  established by the former executive officers was inappropriate 
to the establishment of an environment in which strong systems of internal control and 
disclosure controls and procedures are encouraged. 
• Certain former executive officers of the Company, who were also executive officers at 
the Company’ s various controlling stockholders, did not participate in open and timely 
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communication with those responsible for the preparation of corporate reports or with the 
Board of Directors, in particular its independent members.  
• The management and corporate organizational structures facilitated extraction of assets 
from the Company by way of related party transactions to benefit direct and indirect 
controlling stockholders.  
• Common directorships, among certain former executive officers, at the Company and 
its direct and indirect parent companies and their affiliates, facilitated inappropriate 
related party transactions between the Company and those entities.  
• The management and reporting structures fostered and maintained the perception of 
Ravelston and its direct and indirect subsidiaries being one consolidated corporate group, 
thus blurring the distinction between the interests of individual entities and their 
respective unaffiliated stockholders.  
 
Leapfrog Enterprises Inc. 
In the area of information technology controls, we identified the following insufficient 
controls which we believe constitute a material weakness in the aggregate.  
  • Ineffective logical access and change management controls related to information 
technology systems, data and programs that are used to monitor, record and transfer 
information. These controls relate to the purchase of materials and components used to 
manufacture and assemble our products, the manufacture and assembly of our products, 
the distribution, invoicing and sale of our products and the remittance of payments by our 
vendors, our customers and ourselves related to these activities. 
  • Pervasive inadequacies in enterprise resource planning, or ERP, application controls 
related to appropriate assignment of functions and segregation of duties, which allowed 
employees to access system programs and data or initiate transactions inconsistent with 
their assigned duties. Our ERP systems contain design deficiencies that do not adequately 
segregate and control access, and lack sufficient human oversight over the assignment of 
system access and authorities.   
  • Lack of appropriate training of personnel throughout the organization causing system 
users to be less effective due to insufficient understanding of the systems they manage 
and depend upon.   
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Appendix 2.B First Stage Estimation of Heckman Two-Stage Selection Analysis 
 Dependent Variable 
 MW  tMW  tOccur  tAmend  tVD  
 All MW 
firms 
10K-only 
MW firms 
10K-only 
MW firms 
10K-only 
MW firms 
All MW 
Firms 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Intercept -1.769 
(<0.001) 
-1.844 
(<0.001) 
1.507 
(<0.001) 
1.208 
(0.001) 
0.949 
(<0.001) 
TA -0.000 
(0.600) 
-0.000 
(0.448) 
0.033 
(0.481) 
-0.059 
(0.065) 
0.009 
(0.766) 
AGGREGATE 
LOSS 
0.2748 
(<0.001) 
0.295 
(<0.001) 
-0.114 
(0.510) 
0.238 
(0.063) 
-0.282 
(0.016) 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
0.135 
(<0.001) 
0.156 
(<0.001) 
-0.368 
(0.031) 
0.182 
(0.191) 
0.143 
(0.267) 
SALES GROWTH 0.001 
(0.213) 
0.001 
(0.218) 
0.103 
(0.579) 
0.168 
(0.282) 
-0.061 
(0.460) 
RESTRUCTURING 
CHARGE 
-0.854 
(0.366) 
-0.545 
(0.563) 
-2.145 
(0.668) 
7.255 
(0.138) 
-0.220 
(0.954) 
Number of Obs 
with the dependent 
variable set to one 
708 594 38 106 131 
Number of Total 
Obs 
13,934 13,800 594 700 708 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score (Pr > 2χ ) 
96.867 
(<0.001) 
106.820 
(<0.001) 
7.123 
(0.212) 
16.839 
(0.005) 
8.487 
(0.131) 
 
tMW  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm disclosed a material weakness in 10K, 10KSB, 
or amendment of annual report in year t in our sample period (August 2002 to March 2006), and zero 
otherwise. tOccur  is an indicator variable that is equal to one for a disclosure of material weakness in 10K 
if the firm has prior history of disclosing material weaknesses in annual repots through out our sample 
period (August 2002 to March 2006), and zero otherwise. tAmend  is set to one if the firm disclosed 
material weakness in 10K amendment in year t through out our sample period (August 2002 to March 
2006), and zero otherwise. tVD  is set to one if a voluntary disclosure, or to zero otherwise. TA is firm’ s 
total asset [Compustat #6] in year t. AGGREGATE LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if earnings 
before extraordinary items [Compustat #18] in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a non-zero currency 
transaction [Compustat #150] in year t and zero otherwise. SALES GROWTH is sales [Compustat #12] in 
year t minus the sales in year t-1 and then divided by sales in year t-1. RESTRUCTURING CHARGE is the 
restructuring charge [Compustat #376 * (-1)] in year t scaled by firm’ s asset [Compustat #6] 
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Appendix 2.C Classification of Material Weaknesses According to Five Components 
of Internal Control in COSO(1992)  
 
Control Environment Weaknesses 
Weaknesses related to the integrity, ethical values and competence of entity’ s people, 
management’ s philosophy and operating style, the way management assigns authority 
and responsibility, organizes and develops its people, and the attention and direction 
provided by the board of directors 
Risk Assessment Weaknesses 
Weaknesses related to the identification and analysis of relevant risks to achieve the 
objectives which form the basis to determine how risks should be managed.  
Control Activities Weaknesses 
Weaknesses related to activities like approvals, authorizations, verifications, 
reconciliations, reviews of operating performance, security of assets and segregation of 
duties. 
Information and Communication Weaknesses 
Weaknesses related to the identification, capturing, and communicating information to 
the right people to enable them to carry out their responsibilities. Weaknesses related to 
preparing a timely and accurate financial report.  
Monitoring Weaknesses 
Weaknesses related to the management activities and supervisory activities.  
 
Example: Weakness related to Control Activities and Information and Communication 
Harleysville National Corp. 
The following material weakness has been identified and included in management's 
assessment. There were ineffective controls over employee access to the computer system 
which were identified in the areas of general ledger, deposits, loans, customer 
information files, and the Bank's Automated Clearing House. The purpose of these 
controls is to ensure proper segregation of duties within the identified functional areas. 
 
Example: Weakness related to Control Environment and Monitoring 
Active Power Inc. 
As a part of our assessment as of December 31, 2004, we considered both the 
composition and the limited size of our accounting department and their effect on the 
design of the controls established over our financial reporting process. In December 2004 
our Chief Financial Officer announced his resignation to pursue another opportunity, but 
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agreed to continue to serve as our Chief Financial Officer on a transitional basis through 
the completion of certain financial reporting events, including the filing of the Annual 
Report on Form 10-K. The combination of a limited staff and the transitional status of our 
Chief Financial Officer resulted in ineffective oversight and monitoring controls over our 
year end financial reporting process. In light of these ineffective controls, we have 
concluded that there was more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of 
the annual or interim financial statements would not be prevented or detected, which 
constitutes a “ material weakness”  in our internal control over financial reporting as of 
December 31, 2004. These ineffective controls resulted in revisions to our draft financial 
statements and disclosures. 
 
Example: Weakness related to Risk Assessment, Control Activities 
Rent Way Inc. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers issued a report dated December 28, 2001 to the Company’ s 
Audit Committee summarizing “ reportable conditions”  and “ material weaknesses”  as 
defined by the AICPA in the Company’ s internal control that was initially observed 
during PricewaterhouseCoopers’  audit of the Company’ s financial statements for the 
fiscal year ended September 30, 2000. These conditions and weaknesses, which were 
discussed by PricewaterhouseCoopers with the Company’ s Audit Committee, concerned 
(1) the Company’ s need to conduct a risk assessment to be used in implementing a 
comprehensive system of effective internal control and (2) the Company’ s inability to 
reconcile its general ledger inventory amounts with the inventory amounts as reported by 
its point-of-sale inventory accounting system. PricewaterhouseCoopers issued a report 
dated December 27, 2002 to the Company’ s Audit Committee stating (1) that the 
reportable conditions and material weaknesses relating to the Company’ s need to conduct 
a risk assessment and implement an effective system of internal control had been 
resolved and (2) the reconciliation between the general ledger and point-of-sale system 
continued as a reportable condition. This reportable condition was discussed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers with the Company’ s Audit Committee. This reportable 
condition was subsequently resolved by the Company during the fiscal year ended 
September 30, 2003. The Company has authorized PricewaterhouseCoopers to respond 
fully to the inquiries of Ernst & Young concerning the subject matter of the reportable 
events described above. 
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Appendix 3.A Examples of ERM 
GRACE (W R) & CO (Filing date: 2006/03/13, Form: 10K, page F-62) 
“The nature of our business requires us to deal with risks of several types. We seek to manage 
these risk factors so that the Company is exposed to an acceptable level of risk. We have 
established an Enterprise Risk Management function under our Chief Risk and Compliance 
Officer, the purpose of which is to provide assurance that management is addressing all risks 
facing the Company in a comprehensive and conservative way. The following are examples of 
how we are addressing certain categories of risks: “  
POTASH CORP SASK INC  (Filing date: 2006/03/09, Form: 10K, page 23)  
“  Our performance and future development could be materially affected by a wide range of risk 
factors. Any or all of these risks could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial 
condition, results of operations and cash flows and on the market price of our common stock. We 
use an integrated risk management framework to identify risks across all segments of the 
Company, evaluate those risks, and implement strategies designed to mitigate those risks. Our 
strategies to mitigate these risks are described under “ Managing Risk”  on pages 20 through 22 in 
the Financial Review section of our 2005 Annual Report, attached as Exhibit 13, incorporated 
herein by reference 
ALLSTATE CORP (Filing date: 2005/11/01, Form: 10Q, page 26) 
“ The overarching intent of our catastrophe management strategy is to support profitable growth 
of our homeowners business.  While in many areas of the country we are currently achieving 
returns within acceptable risk management tolerances, our goal is to find solutions that support a 
continued yet prudent presence in catastrophe prone markets.  Allstate is introducing integrated 
enterprise risk management (“ERM”) capabilities as part of our continued commitment to 
effective management of our capital, returns and risk profile.  A principal ERM goal is to validate 
where and how we insure homeowners catastrophes and to further increase our return on equity, 
thereby lessening our earnings volatility and capital requirements.  In introducing integrated ERM 
capabilities, we are considering and adopting new performance measurements for managing our 
homeowners business.  These measurements currently include establishing an exposure limit 
based on hurricane and earthquake losses which have a one percent probability of occurring on an 
annual aggregate countrywide basis, refining acceptable targeted rates of return by line and by 
state and evaluating potential capital impairment measurements.  Actions resulting from the 
evaluation of these measurements will reduce our catastrophe risk and improve long-term 
returns.”   
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Appendix 3.B List of 114 ERM firms 
Company Name Company Name Company Name 
3M CO FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC OGE ENERGY CORP 
ACXIOM CORP FRIEDMN BILLINGS RMSY  -CL A PEDIATRIC SVCS AMERICA INC 
AGL RESOURCES INC FTI CONSULTING INC PEPCO HOLDINGS INC 
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS  GATX CORP PEPSICO INC 
ALCAN INC GENERAL ELECTRIC CO PHOENIX COMPANIES INC 
ALCOA INC GENERAL MOTORS CORP PIEDMONT NATURAL GAS CO 
ALLEGHENY ENERGY INC GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC PIPER JAFFRAY COS INC 
ALLSTATE CORP GRACE (W R) & CO PITNEY BOWES INC 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INC PLAINS ALL AMER PIPELNE  -LP 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP HANDLEMAN CO PNM RESOURCES INC 
AMN HEALTHCARE SERVICES  HEALTHSOUTH CORP POTASH CORP SASK INC 
ANWORTH MTG ASSET CORP IDACORP INC PPL CORP 
APACHE CORP ILLUMINA INC PROGRESS ENERGY INC 
AVISTA CORP IMPAC MORTGAGE HOLDINGS  PUBLIC SERVICE ENTRP GRP INC 
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES  IMPERIAL SUGAR CO PUGET ENERGY INC 
BEARINGPOINT INC INDEPENDENCE HOLDING CO RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL  
BLACK HILLS CORP INNOSPEC INC REINSURANCE GROUP AMER INC 
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS SAFECO CORP 
BUNGE LTD INTL GAME TECHNOLOGY SAKS INC 
CABOT CORP KEYSPAN CORP SIERRA PACIFIC RESOURCES 
CATAPULT COMMUNICATIONS KINDER MORGAN ENERGY  -LP SIGMATRON INTERNATIONAL INC 
CHESAPEAKE UTILITIES CORP KINDER MORGAN INC SMUCKER (JM) CO 
CLECO CORP KINDRED HEALTHCARE INC SOUTH JERSEY INDUSTRIES INC 
CMS ENERGY CORP LEGG MASON INC TESORO CORP 
CONSTELLATION ENERGY GRP  LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS  TEXTRON INC 
CRAWFORD & CO LENNAR CORP TXU CORP 
CROSSTEX ENERGY LP LIONBRIDGE TECHNOLOGIES INC UGI CORP 
CUMMINS INC MARRIOTT INTL INC UNISOURCE ENERGY CORP 
DUKE ENERGY CORP MBIA INC VECTREN CORP 
EDISON INTERNATIONAL MCF CORP VECTREN UTILITY HOLDINGS INC 
EL PASO CORP MENTOR CORP WEBMETHODS INC 
ENBRIDGE ENERGY PRTNRS   MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC XCEL ENERGY INC 
ENERGY WEST INC MGIC INVESTMENT CORP/WI XTO ENERGY INC 
ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS  MGP INGREDIENTS INC ZOLL MEDICAL CORP 
EQUITABLE RESOURCES INC MORGAN STANLEY  
EXELON CORP NESTOR INC  
FERRELLGAS PARTNERS  -LP NEW JERSEY RESOURCES CORP  
FIRSTENERGY CORP NEWTEK BUSINESS SERVICES INC  
FLUOR CORP NICOR INC  
FORD MOTOR CO NORTHEAST UTILITIES  
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Appendix 3.C Probit Model for Determinants of ERM Adoption 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
( 1)  
                                
i i i i i
i i i
Prob ERM Big4 FS ZScore DE Ratio
Investment Opportunity Foreign Transaction
β β β β β
β β ε
= = + + + +
+ + +
 
Dependent Variable 
 ERM 
Variables 
Coefficients 
(Pr> 2χ ) 
0β (Intercept) 3.380 (<0.001) 
1β (Big4) -0.071 (0.441) 
2β (Size) -0.239 (<0.001) 
3β (Z-Score) 0.003 (0.037) 
4β (DERatio) -0.006 (0.241) 
5β (Investment Opportunity) 1.545 (0.012) 
6β (Foreign Transactions) 0.582 (<0.001) 
Number of ERM firms 244 
Number of Non-ERM firms 7,232 
Likelihood Ratio Score 
(Pr> 2χ ) 
511.265 
(<0.001) 
 
iERM  is an indicator variable about whether firm i engages in ERM ( 1iERM = ) or did not engage in ERM 
( 1iERM = ) at any point during 2005. iBig4  is a dummy variable and is set to one if firm i’ s auditor is from big 
four CPA firms, or set to zero otherwise. iFS  stands for firm size and is measured as the logarithm of firm i’ s total 
assets (Compustat #6). iZScore  is the Z-score developed following Altman (1968).  iDE Ratio  is to divide total 
debt (Compustat #9 + Compustat#34) by stockholder’ s equity (Compustat #216).  iInvestment Opportunity  is 
the sum of capital expenditure (Compustat #128) and R&D expenditures (Compustat #46) scaled by firm’ s total assets. 
 iForeign Transaction  in a dummy takes on a value of one if firm i has none zero foreign currency adjustment 
(Compustat #150) in 2005, and zero otherwise. 
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 Appendix 3.D ERM Index (ERMI) 
ERMI (ERM Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑  
Indicator Definition 
1Strategy  1Strategy = ( ) /i Sales SalesSales µ σ− , where iSales =Sales of firm i in 2005, Salesµ =  
average industry sales in 2005, and Salesσ = standard deviation of sales of all firms in the 
same industry. 
2Strategy  2Strategy = ( ) /i β ββ µ σ∆ ∆∆ − , where  iβ∆ = - ( iβ  in 2005 - iβ  in 2004), iβ = firm i ‘s 
beta (data from Compustat), βµ∆ = average industry β∆  in 2005, and βσ ∆ = standard 
deviation of β∆ ’ s of all firms in the same industry. 
1Operation  1Operation =(Sales Compustat #6)/(Total Assets Compustat #12). 
2Operation  2Operation = Sales/ (Number of Employees Compustat #29). 
1Reporting  1Reporting = (Material Weakness)+(Auditor Opinion)+(Restatement), where Material 
Weakness is set to -1 if a firm discloses any material weakness in its 10K, otherwise is set to 
0; Auditor Opinion is set equal to 0 if a firm has unqualified opinions in its 10K, otherwise it 
is set to -1; and Restatement is set to -1 if a firm announced a restatement in 2005, otherwise 
it is set to 0 (data is from GAO, 2006). 
2Reporting  2Reporting  = /( )NormalAccruals NormalAccruals AbnormalAccruals+ , 
where AbnormalAccruals is the error term from the regression model 
1 1 1 1 2 1/ [1/ ] [ / ] [ / ]ijt ijt jt ijt jt ijt ijt jt ijt ijt ijtTA A A REV A PPE A eα β β− − − −= + ∆ + + , ijtTA = 
total accruals and is defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) minus 
operating cash flows (Compustat #308)), 1ijtA − = total assets (Compustat #6), ijtREV∆ = 
change in net revenues (Compustat #12), ijtPPE = gross property plant and equipment 
(Compustat #8), ijte = error term, NormalAccruals is defined as ijtTA  minus 
AbnormalAccruals. 
1Compliance  1Compliance  =  /  Auditor Fees Total Assets , where data for Audit Fees is hand 
collected from firm’ s proxy statements and data for  Total Assets is from Compustat #6. 
2Compliance  2Compliance =  Settlement Net Gain/Total Assets , where data for 
Settlement Net Gain and  Total Assets are from Compustat #372 and #6, respectively. 
Notes:  
1. Each of the eight indicators is standardized among all ERM firms before being combined. 
2. Whenever the industry is mentioned, the industry is measured as all active firms with the same two 
digits SIC code in Compustat
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Figure 2.1 Time Series of Yearly Averaged Market-value Deflated by Asset ( MV TA ): 10K-only MW group vs. Control group 
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10K-only MW group are 594 firm-years with disclosures of material weaknesses in 10Ks from August 2002 through March 2006. Control group are 13,823 firm-
years for firms that never disclose any material weakness from August 2002 through March 2006. Market-value ( MV ) is the stock price multiplied by shares 
outstanding [from CRSP] 91 days after year end for control group. For 10K-only MW group the stock price is on the later date of actual filing date and 91 days 
after year end. Data for total assets (TA ) come from Compustat #6. MV TA  is averaged for 10K-only MW group and control group separately ever fiscal year 
from 2002 to 2005.  
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Figure 3.1 Contingency View of ERM and Firm Performance 
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Table 2.1 Sample Selection 
 
 Number of 
Observations  
Material Weakness Sample:  
 Identified material weakness disclosures from August 2002 to 
March 2006 (1,396 firms) 
1,585 
 Less disclosures not in 10K, 10K/A, 10KSB, or 10KSB/A (349 
firms) 
(364) 
 Less firm-years not covered by Compustat    (181) 
 Less firm-years with unavailable data for empirical test      (306) 
Total material weakness sample       708 
    Material weakness sample in 10K/A (106) 
    Material weakness sample in 10KSB (6) 
    Material weakness sample in 10KSB/A        (2) 
10K-only material weakness sample       594 
Compustat Control Sample:  
 All Compustat firm-years from 2002 to 2005 23,750 
 Less firms identified as having at least one disclosure of material 
weakness from August 2002 to March 2006 (1,396 firms) 
(5,024) 
 Less firm-years with unavailable data for empirical test (5,273) 
 Outliers*      (247) 
Total control sample used in multivariate regressions    13,206 
 
* Outliers are firm-years with 1% from each of the variables t tMV TA , t tBV TA , and t tAE TA . 
MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured as the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding [from CRSP] 
91 days after year end for control group. For material weakness sample the stock price is on the later date 
of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. BV is the firm’ s book value of equity at year end 
[Compustat #216]. TA  is firm’ s total asset [Compustat #6].  . 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Material Weakness Sample versus Compustat Control Sample 
 
 Material Weakness Sample Compustat Control Firms  (Non-Material Weakness Firms) 
t-test of mean 
differences 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Two-tailed p-value 
MV  1,632,470.410 9,076,890.520 2,495,623.810 11,903,122.320 0.016 
BV  808.193 5,686.59 1,187.980 5,607.680 0.038 
AE  -15.678 335.591 22.770 379.501 <0.001 
/MV TA  1,159.560 1,127.200 1,154.620 1,361.370 0.911 
/BV TA  0.419 0.310 0.422 0.304 0.722 
/AE TA  0.001 0.079 0.014 0.090 <0.001 
TA  5,944.630 57,606.31 6,297.57 50,195.850 0.830 
AGGREGATE LOSS 0.446 0.497 0.277 0.448 <0.001 
FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS 0.265 0.442 0.169 0.375 <0.001 
SALES GROWTH 4.106 121.908 0.181 3.789 <0.001 
RESTRUCTURING CHARGE 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.018 0.353 
MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured as the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding [from CRSP] 91 days after year end for control group. For material 
weakness sample the stock price is on the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. BV is the firm’ s book value of equity at year end 
[Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  is the net income [Compustat #58] and tR is the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year 
government notes in year t. TA  is firm’ s total asset [Compustat #6]. AGGREGATE LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if earnings before extraordinary 
items [data item #18] in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero, and zero otherwise. FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has 
a non-zero currency transaction [Compustat #150] in year t and zero otherwise. SALES GROWTH is sales [Compustat #12] in year t minus the sales in year t-1 
and then divided by sales in year t-1. RESTRUCTURING CHARGE is the restructuring charge [Compustat #376 * (-1)] in year t scaled by firm’ s asset [data item 
#6] 
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Table 2.3 Spearman\Pearson Correlation Analysis 
 
 MW  /MV TA  /BV TA  /AE TA  TA  AGGREGATE   
LOSS 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
SALES 
GROWTH 
RESTRUCTURING 
CHARGE 
MW  1 0.001 (0.9252) 
-0.003 
(0.723) 
-0.032 
(<0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.830) 
0.074 
(<0.001) 
0.050 
(<0.001) 
0.031 
(<0.001) 
0.005 
(0.476) 
/MV TA  0.034 (<0.001) 1 
0.396 
(<0.001) 
0.077 
(<0.001) 
-0.083 
(<0.001) 
0.101 
(<0.001) 
0.001 
(0.925) 
0.060 
(<0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.886) 
/BV TA  0.002 (0.799) 
0.590 
(<0.001) 1 
-0.001 
(0.277) 
-0.107 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.590) 
0.094 
(<0.001) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
0.005 
(0.497) 
/AE TA  -0.047 (<0.001) 
0.211 
(<0.001) 
0.117 
(<0.001) 1 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
0.129 
(<0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.377) 
0.004 
(0.534) 
-0.005 
(0.509) 
TA  0.054 (<0.001) 
-0.350 
(<0.001) 
-0.347 
(<0.001) 
-0.052 
(<0.001) 1 
-0.058 
(<0.001) 
0.036 
(<0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.914) 
-0.013 
(0.080) 
AGGREGATE   
LOSS 
0.074 
(<0.001) 
0.069 
(<0.001) 
0.059 
(<0.001) 
0.032 
(<0.001) 
-0.181 
(<0.001) 1 
0.061 
(<0.001) 
0.013 
(0.070) 
0.150 
(<0.001) 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
0.050 
(<0.001) 
0.020 
(0.021) 
0.104 
(<0.001) 
0.047 
(<0.001) 
0.233 
(<0.001) 
0.061 
(<0.001) 1 
-0.002 
(0.772) 
0.062 
(<0.001) 
SALES GROWTH 
0.046 
(<0.001) 
0.231 
(<0.001) 
0.104 
(<0.001) 
0.255 
(<0.001) 
0.241 
(<0.001) 
-0.193 
(<0.001) 
0.096 
(<0.001) 
1 -0.002 
(0.740) 
RESTRUCTURING 
CHARGE 
0.033 
(<0.001) 
0.004 
(0.602) 
0.003 
(0.666) 
-0.035 
(<0.001) 
0.114 
(<0.001) 
0.122 
(<0.001) 
0.137 
(<0.001) 
-0.097 
(<0.001) 
1 
tMW  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm disclosed a material weakness in 10K, 10KSB, or amendment of annual report in year t in our 
sample period (August 2002 to March 2006), and zero otherwise. MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured as the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding 
[from CRSP] 91 days after year end for control group. For material weakness sample the stock price is on the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after 
year end. BV is the firm’ s book value of equity at year end [Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  is the net income [Compustat #58] and tR is 
the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year government notes in year t. TA  is firm’ s total asset [Compustat #6]. AGGREGATE LOSS is an indicator 
variable equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items [data item #18] in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero, and zero otherwise. FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a non-zero currency transaction [Compustat #150] in year t and zero otherwise. SALES 
GROWTH is sales [Compustat #12] in year t minus the sales in year t-1 and then divided by sales in year t-1. RESTRUCTURING CHARGE is the restructuring 
charge [Compustat #376 * (-1)] in year t scaled by firm’ s asset [data item #6] 
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Table 2.4 Market Valuation of Disclosures of Material Weaknesses 
   0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1
n T
t t t t t i i j jt t
i j
MV TA BV TA AE TA MW Industry Yearβ β β β β β
= =
= + + + + +∑ ∑   
  Selectivity Control Method 
Dependent Variable= t tMV TA  
  
All MW 
firms 
10K-only 
MW firms 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
(10K-only MW firms) 
Propensity Score 
Matching (10K-only 
MW firms) 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Signs 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Intercept  
123.609 
(0.573) 
146.071 
(0.513) 
374.841 
(0.096) 
686.719 
(<0.001) 
t tBV TA  + 
1,105.337 
(<0.001) 
1,103.993 
(<0.001) 
1,108.430 
(<0.001) 
1,899.534 
(<0.001) 
t tAE TA  + 
829.146 
(<0.001) 
820.243 
(<0.001) 
920.800 
(<0.001) 
2,829.208 
(<0.001) 
tMW  −  
-159.776 
(0.001) 
-169.869 
(0.001) 
-2,265.122 
(<0.001) 
-222.170 
(0.018) 
Industry Indicators  Included Included Included  
1Year (2003)  
451.235 
(<0.001) 
451.235 
(<0.001) 
441.886 
(<0.001) 
 
2Year (2004)  
393.137 
(<0.001) 
393.484 
(<0.001) 
372.357 
(<0.001) 
 
3Year (2005)  
425.657 
(<0.001) 
431.874 
(<0.001) 
408.747 
(<0.001) 
 
Number of Material 
Weakness Obs 
 708 594 594 594 
Number of Total 
Obs 
 13,934 13,800 13,800 1,188 
Adjusted 2R   27.39% 27.37% 27.46% 6.08% 
tMW  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm disclosed a material weakness in 10K, 10KSB, 
or amendment of annual report in year t in our sample period (August 2002 to March 2006), and zero 
otherwise. MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured as the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding 
[from CRSP] 91 days after year end for control group. For material weakness sample the stock price is on 
the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. BV is the firm’ s book value of equity at year 
end [Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  is the net income [Compustat #58] and tR is 
the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year government notes in year t. TA  is firm’ s total asset 
[Compustat #6]. Industry Indicators are set to one if the firm is in a particular industry, or to zero otherwise. 
Industry classification is based on firm’ s first two digits of SIC code, following Barth et al (1998). Year is 
set to one for the current year or zero if otherwise.   
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Table 2.5 Market Valuation of Disclosures of Material Weaknesses: FRIC vs. MTRIC 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1
n T
t t t t t t i i j jt t
i j
M V TA BV TA AE TA FR M TR Industry Yearβ β β β β β β
= =
= + + + + + +∑ ∑
 
  Selectivity Control Method 
Dependent Variable= t tMV TA  
  
All MW firms 
10K-only MW 
firms 
Propensity Score 
Matching  
(10K-only MW firms) 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Signs 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Intercept  
122.421 
(0.576) 
145.334 
(0.516) 
687.903 
(<0.001) 
t tBV TA  + 
1,105.234 
(<0.001) 
1,103.843 
(<0.001) 
1,895.609 
(<0.001) 
t tAE TA  + 
829.087 
(<0.001) 
820.322 
(<0.001) 
2,886.858 
(<0.001) 
tFR  −  
-141.607 
(0.021) 
-146.323 
(0.035) 
-112.401 
(0.579) 
tMTR  −  
-181.827 
(0.007) 
-193.899 
(0.006) 
-335.770 
(0.102) 
Industry Indicators  Included Included  
1Year (2003)  
451.211 
(<0.001) 
451.192 
(<0.001) 
 
2Year (2004)  
392.974 
(<0.001) 
393.337 
(<0.001) 
 
3Year (2005)  
425.641 
(<0.001) 
431.800 
(<0.001) 
 
Number of Material 
Weakness Obs 
 708 594 594 
Number of Total Obs  13,934 13,800 1,188 
Adjusted 2R   27.39% 27.37% 6.08% 
tFR is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses in reporting-only controls, or to zero otherwise. 
tMTR  is set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses in more-than-reporting controls, or to zero 
otherwise. MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured as the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding 
[from CRSP] 91 days after year end for control group. For material weakness sample the stock price is on 
the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. BV is the firm’ s book value of equity at year 
end [Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  is the net income [Compustat #58] and tR is 
the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year government notes in year t. TA  is firm’ s total asset 
[Compustat #6]. Industry Indicators are set to one if the firm is in a particular industry, or to zero otherwise. 
Industry classification is based on firm’ s first two digits of SIC code, following Barth et al (1998). Year is 
set to one for the current year or zero if otherwise.   
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Table 2.6 Market Valuation of Disclosures of Material Weaknesses: COSO (1992) 
Five Control Components 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1
n T
t t t t t t t t t i i j jt t
i j
MV TA BV TA AE TA E R A I M Industry Yearβ β β β β β β β β β
= =
= + + + + + + + + +∑ ∑
 
 Selectivity Control Method 
Dependent Variable= t tMV TA  
 
All MW firms 
10K-only MW 
firms 
Propensity Score Matching  
(10K-only MW firms) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Intercept 116.195 
(0.596) 
140.686 
(0.529) 
631.769 
(<0.001) 
t tBV TA  
1,105.387 
(<0.001) 
1,104.388 
(<0.001) 
1,918.900 
(<0.001) 
t tAE TA  
831.667 
(<0.001) 
823.615 
(<0.001) 
2,952.225 
(<0.001) 
tE  
-3.117 
(0.974) 
-8.345 
(0.935) 
223.457 
(0.369) 
tR  
260.849 
(0.399) 
228.140 
(0.477) 
275.686 
(0.718) 
tA  
-161.882 
(0.053) 
-145.661 
(0.111) 
-229.356 
(0.309) 
tI  
-83.948 
(0.210) 
-98.499 
(0.192) 
-58.452 
(0.770) 
tM  
75.189 
(0.479) 
95.958 
(0.393) 
-138.869 
(0.613) 
Industry Indicators Included Included  
1Year (2003) 
450.818 
(<0.001) 
450.763 
(<0.001) 
 
2Year (2004) 
391.355 
(<0.001) 
391.254 
(<0.001) 
 
3Year (2005) 
425.789 
(<0.001) 
431.832 
(<0.001) 
 
Number of Material 
Weakness Obs 
708 594 594 
Number of Total 
Obs 
13,934 13,800 1,188 
Adjusted 2R  27.38% 27.35% 5.81% 
tE tR tA tI  and tM are set to one if a disclosure of material weaknesses is respectively related to the 
COSO (1992) five control components, or to zero otherwise. MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured as 
the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding 91 days after year end for control group. For material 
weakness sample the stock price is on the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. BV is 
the firm’ s book value of equity at year end [Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  is the 
net income [Compustat #58] and tR is the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year government notes 
in year t. TA  is firm’ s total asset [Compustat #6]. Industry Indicators are set to one if the firm is in a 
particular industry, or to zero otherwise. Year is set to one for the current year or zero if otherwise.   
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Table 2.7 Market Valuation of Repetitive Disclosures of Material Weaknesses 
Model 1: 0 1 2 3t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA Occurβ β β β= + + +  
Model 2: 0 1 2 3 4t t t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA Occur Occur MTRβ β β β β= + + + + ×  
Model 3: 
0 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA Occur Occur MTR Occur Eβ β β β β β= + + + + × + ×  
 Dependent Variable= t tMV TA  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Propensity Score Matching  
Independent Variables 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Intercept 
297.424 
(0.842) 
305.630 
(0.838) 
271.282 
(0.855) 
288.436 
(0.848) 
t tBV TA  
901.870 
(<0.001) 
902.927 
(<0.001) 
927.586 
(<0.001) 
861.659 
(<0.001) 
t tAE TA  
-844.973 
(0.052) 
-806.377 
(0.054) 
-825.745 
(0.048) 
-761.215 
(0.070) 
tOccur  
143.917 
(0.573) 
328.788 
(0.343) 
-58.520 
(0.266) 
-743.601 
(0.643) 
t tOccur MTR×   
-389.003 
(0.429) 
-551.292 
(0.266) 
-1,303.930 
(0.160) 
t tOccur E×    
1,149.740 
(0.022) 
871.460 
(0.351) 
Industry Indicator Included Included Included Included 
1Year (2003) 
490.779 
(0.179) 
487.161 
(0.182) 
491.343 
(0.177) 
478.350 
(0.191) 
2Year (2004) 
400.318 
(0.227) 
403.295 
(0.223) 
416.990 
(0.206) 
397.395 
(0.231) 
3Year (2005) 
520.496 
(0.157) 
512.588 
(0.164) 
532.125 
(0.147) 
542.186 
(0.139) 
Number of Repeat 
Material Weakness Obs 
38 38 38 38 
Number of Total 
Material Weakness Obs  
594 594 594 594 
Adjusted 2R  5.86% 5.80% 6.56% 5.95% 
tOccur  is an indicator variable that is equal to one for a disclosure of material weakness in 10K if the firm 
has prior history of disclosing material weaknesses in annual repots through out our sample period (August 
2002 to March 2006), and zero otherwise. MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured as the stock price 
multiplied by shares outstanding 91 days after year end for control group. For material weakness sample 
the stock price is on the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. BV is the firm’ s book 
value of equity at year end [Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  is the net income 
[Compustat #58] and tR is the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year government notes in year t. 
TA  is firm’ s total asset [Compustat #6]. Industry Indicators are set to one if the firm is in a particular 
industry, or to zero otherwise. Year is set to one for the current year or zero if otherwise.   
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Table 2.8 Market Valuation of Material Weaknesses Disclosed in Amended 10Ks 
Model 1: 0 1 2 3t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA Amendβ β β β= + + +  
Model 2: 0 1 2 3 4t t t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA Amend Amend MTRβ β β β β= + + + + ×  
Model 3: 
0 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA Amend Amend MTR Amend Eβ β β β β β= + + + ++ × + ×
 
 Dependent Variable= t tMV TA  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Propensity Score Matching 
Independent Variables 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Intercept 
-15.764 
(0.988) 
-25.648 
(0.980) 
-37.767 
(0.971) 
685.704 
(0.508) 
t tBV TA  
915.804 
(<0.001) 
915.651 
(<0.001) 
920.516 
(<0.001) 
969.140 
(<0.001) 
t tAE TA  
-763.595 
(0.048) 
-765.111 
(0.047) 
-774.113 
(0.045) 
-721.050 
(0.060) 
tAmend  
-96.839 
(0.530) 
-80.516 
(0.638) 
-55.096 
(0.755) 
-2,642.128 
(<0.001) 
t tAmend MTR×   
-74.861 
(0.826) 
-15.417 
(0.965) 
-385.132 
(0.342) 
t tAmend E×    
-234.916 
(0.562) 
-9.793 
(0.981) 
Industry Indicator Included Included Included Included 
1Year (2003) 
528.063 
(0.116) 
529.703 
(0.115) 
525.267 
(0.118) 
532.464 
(0.110) 
2Year (2004) 
411.956 
(0.176) 
414.101 
(0.175) 
410.375 
(0.179) 
403.422 
(0.182) 
3Year (2005) 
588.776 
(0.081) 
590.389 
(0.080) 
587.029 
(0.082) 
560.522 
(0.094) 
Number of Material Weakness 
Obs in Amended 10Ks 
106 106 106 106 
Number of Total Material 
Weakness Obs  
700 700 700 700 
Adjusted 2R  9.50% 9.37% 9.27% 11.34% 
tAmend  is set to one if the firm disclosed material weakness in 10K amendment in year t through out our 
sample period (August 2002 to March 2006), and zero otherwise. MV is the firm’ s market-value, 
measured as the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding 91 days after year end for control group. For 
material weakness sample the stock price is on the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. 
BV is the firm’ s book value of equity at year end [Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  
is the net income [Compustat #58] and tR is the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year government 
notes in year t. TA  is firm’ s total asset [Compustat #6]. Industry Indicators are set to one if the firm is in a 
particular industry, or to zero otherwise. Year is set to one for the current year or zero if otherwise  
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Table 2.9 Market Valuation of Voluntary Disclosures of Material Weaknesses 
Model 1: 0 1 2 3t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA VDβ β β β= + + +  
Model 2: 0 1 2 3 4t t t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA VD VD MTRβ β β β β= + + + + ×  
Model 3: 0 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t t tt tMV TA BV TA AE TA VD VD MTR VD Eβ β β β β β= + + + + + × + ×  
         Dependent Variable= t tMV TA  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Inverse Mills Ratio 
Independent Variables 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(p-value) 
Coeff Est 
(pr> 2χ ) 
Intercept 
9.042 
(0.993) 
-56.389 
(0.957) 
-30.520 
(0.977) 
-991.241 
(0.344) 
t tBV TA  
945.392 
(<0.001) 
943.310 
(<0.001) 
954.577 
(<0.001) 
987.710 
(<0.001) 
t tAE TA  
-757.399 
(0.050) 
-779.674 
(0.044) 
-825.748 
(0.034) 
-624.416 
(0.108) 
tVD  
-76.662 
(0.721) 
-170.063 
(0.478) 
-101.384 
(0.686) 
3,102.960 
(<0.001) 
t tVD MTR×   
221.411 
(0.382) 
275.385 
(0.289) 
-356.879 
(0.298) 
t tVD E×    
-242.440 
(0.353) 
273.692 
(0.435) 
Industry Indicator Included Included Included Included 
1Year (2003) 
513.110 
(0.127) 
562.993 
(0.099) 
542.529 
(0.113) 
537.177 
(0.108) 
2Year (2004) 
326.842 
(0.360) 
393.010 
(0.282) 
361.249 
(0.325) 
428.164 
(0.159) 
3Year (2005) 
487.207 
(0.212) 
556.279 
(0.162) 
524.411 
(0.189) 
596.730 
(0.075) 
Number of Voluntarily-
Disclosed Material 
Weakness  
131 131 131 131 
Number of Total Material 
Weakness Obs  
708 708 708 708 
Adjusted 2R  9.68% 9.64% 9.62% 11.33% 
tVD  is set to one if a voluntary disclosure, or to zero otherwise. MV is the firm’ s market-value, measured 
as the stock price multiplied by shares outstanding 91 days after year end for control group. For material 
weakness sample the stock price is on the later date of actual filing date and 91 days after year end. BV is 
the firm’ s book value of equity at year end [Compustat #216]. tAE = tNI - 1t tR BV −× , where tNI  is the 
net income [Compustat #58] and tR is the average of 12 monthly interest rates of 5-year government notes 
in year t. TA  is firm’ s total asset [Compustat #6]. Industry Indicators are set to one if the firm is in a 
particular industry, or to zero otherwise. Year is set to one for the current year or zero if otherwise
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Table 3.1 Industry Distribution of the Sample 
   Industry  Number of Observations 
Percentage 
Utility 41 35.96% 
Financial Trading 13 11.40% 
Business Service 9 7.89% 
Insurance 9 7.89% 
Drugs 6 5.26% 
Lab Equipment 5 4.39% 
Energy  4 3.51% 
Food 4 3.51% 
Autos 3 2.63% 
Health 3 2.63% 
Construction 2 1.75% 
Machinery 2 1.75% 
Retail 2 1.75% 
Steel 2 1.75% 
Transportation 2 1.75% 
Chips 1 0.88% 
Meals 1 0.88% 
Miscellaneous 1 0.88% 
Paper 1 0.88% 
Telecommunication 1 0.88% 
Toys 1 0.88% 
Wholesale 1 0.88% 
     Total 114 100% 
 
Note: Industry classification is based on Fama and French industry classification for SIC two-digit 
codes (see Appendix A of Fama and French, 1997). 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics   
 
Total Sample 
High Performing Firms 
(Excess Return>2%) 
The Other Firms 
(Excess Return≤ 2%) 
Test of Differences in 
Means 
Variables Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Differencea P-value 
P 1.050 26.681 21.533 18.495 -17.384 18.071 38.917 <0.001 
ERMI 0.000 2.625 -0.073 2.271 0.066 2.926 -0.140 0.776 
EU 2.086 1.182 2.160 1.382 2.020 0.975 0.140 0.531 
CI 0.954 0.051 0.953 0.056 0.955 0.046 -0.002 0.829 
FC 0.473 0.231 0.456 0.222 0.487 0.239 -0.031 0.476 
FS 8.694 2.153 8.988 2.047 8.428 2.228 0.560 0.165 
MBD 1.250 0.305 1.256 0.282 1.245 0.327 0.011 0.846 
Number of 
Observations 114 54 60  
 
P (firm performance) is measured by the one-year excess stock market return at the year end of 2005. ERMI (ERM 
Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑ , where all indicators are defined in 
Appendix D. EU (Environmental uncertainty)= ( )3
1
log ( )
k
k
CV X
=
∑ , where 5 2
,
1
( ) ( ) / 5
k k t k k
t
CV X z z z
=
= −∑ , 
, , , 1
( )
k t k t k t
z X X
−
= − , 
,k tX = uncertainty surrogate k in year t, k = 1 to 3 to represent market (sales, Compustat #12), 
technological (sum of R&D Compustat #46 and capital expenditures Compustat #128 divided by total assets Compustat 
#6) or income (net income, Compustat #170) uncertainty, and kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty 
surrogate k. CI (Competition Within Industry) is measured as (1- HHI), where HHI represents the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market and market share is each firm’ s sales (Compustat #12) divided by the total sales 
of the industry. FC(Firm complexity) is measured by the number of business segments (from Compustat Segments) for 
each firm. FS(Firm size) is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets (Compustat #6). MBD(Monitoring 
by Board of Director) is measured by the number of directors for each firm divided by the natural logarithm of sales, 
where number of directors was hand collected from the 2005 10-K files of firms. 
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Table 3.3 Sample Spearman\Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=114) 
 
P (firm performance) is measured by the one-year excess stock market return at the year end of 2005. ERMI (ERM 
Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑ , where all indicators are defined in 
Appendix D. EU (Environmental uncertainty)= ( )3
1
log ( )
k
k
CV X
=
∑ , where 5 2
,
1
( ) ( ) / 5
k k t k k
t
CV X z z z
=
= −∑ , 
, , , 1
( )
k t k t k t
z X X
−
= − , 
,k tX = uncertainty surrogate k in year t, k = 1 to 3 to represent market (sales, Compustat #12), 
technological (sum of R&D Compustat #46 and capital expenditures Compustat #128 divided by total assets Compustat 
#6) or income (net income, Compustat #170) uncertainty, and kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty 
surrogate k. CI (Competition Within Industry) is measured as (1- HHI), where HHI represents the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market and market share is each firm’ s sales (Compustat #12) divided by the total sales 
of the industry. FC(Firm complexity) is measured by the number of business segments (from Compustat Segments) for 
each firm. FS(Firm size) is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets (Compustat #6). MBD(Monitoring 
by Board of Director) is measured by the number of directors for each firm divided by the natural logarithm of sales, 
where number of directors was hand collected from the 2005 10-K files of firms. Pearson correlations are reported 
above the diagonal, and Spearman correlations are reported below.  
 P ERMI EU CI FC FS MBD 
P 1 
0.094 
(0.319) 
0.076 
(0.424) 
-0.035 
(0.714) 
-0.108 
(0.251) 
0.149 
(0.114) 
-0.049 
(0.608) 
ERMI 
0.038 
(0.691) 1 
-0.181 
(0.054) 
-0.280 
(0.003) 
-0.063 
(0.506) 
-0.035 
(0.708) 
-0.264 
(0.005) 
EU 0.059 (0.533) 
-0.192 
(0.041) 1 
0.042 
(0.660) 
-0.030 
(0.754) 
-0.066 
(0.485) 
0.219 
(0.019) 
CI 0.131 
(0.165) 
-0.303 
(0.001) 
0.104 
(0.271) 
1 0.141 
(0.134) 
-0.102 
(0.278) 
0.086 
(0.362) 
FC 
-0.040 
(0.674) 
-0.153 
(0.104) 
-0.008 
(0.936) 
0.171 
(0.069) 1 
-0.054 
(0.566) 
0.068 
(0.472) 
FS 
0.201 
(0.032) 
-0.075 
(0.430) 
0.056 
(0.552) 
0.028 
(0.764) 
0.032 
(0.732) 1 
-0.454 
(<0.001) 
MBD 0.080 (0.397) 
-0.278 
(0.003) 
0.196 
(0.036) 
0.178 
(0.058) 
0.068 
(0.475) 
-0.341 
(<0.001) 1 
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Table 3.4 Main Analysis 
Panel A  Regression of ERMI on Contingent Variables 
0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBDβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
Panel B Residual Analysis (All 114 ERM Firms) 0 1i i iP ARESβ β ε= + +                                  
 
 
P (firm performance) is measured by the one-year excess stock market return at the year end of 2005.  
ERMI (ERM Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑ , where all indicators are 
defined in Appendix D. EU (Environmental uncertainty)= ( )3
1
log ( )
k
k
CV X
=
∑ , where 5 2
,
1
( ) ( ) / 5
k k t k k
t
CV X z z z
=
= −∑ , 
, , , 1
( )
k t k t k t
z X X
−
= − , 
,k tX = uncertainty surrogate k in year t, k = 1 to 3 to represent market (sales, Compustat #12), 
technological (sum of R&D Compustat #46 and capital expenditures Compustat #128 divided by total assets Compustat 
#6) or income (net income, Compustat #170) uncertainty, and kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty 
surrogate k. CI (Competition Within Industry) is measured as (1- HHI), where HHI represents the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market and market share is each firm’ s sales (Compustat #12) divided by the total sales 
of the industry. FC(Firm complexity) is measured by the number of business segments (from Compustat Segments) for 
each firm. FS(Firm size) is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets (Compustat #6). MBD(Monitoring 
by Board of Director) is measured by the number of directors for each firm divided by the natural logarithm of sales, 
where number of directors was hand collected from the 2005 10-K files of firms. 
 20.626 - 0.217 - 12.707 2.283 - 0.372 - 2.977 
i i i i i i
ERMI EU CI FC FS MBD= − . 
i i i
ARES ERMI ERMI= − .      
 
Total Sample 
High Performing Firms 
(Excess Return>2%) 
The Other Firms 
(Excess Return≤ 2%) 
Number of Obs 114 54 60 
Variables Coefficients (p-value) 
VIF 
(Tolerance) 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
VIF 
(Tolerance) 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
VIF 
(Tolerance) 
0β (Intercept) 19.423 (<0.001) N/A (N/A) 20.626 (<0.001) N/A (N/A) 16.126 (0.079) N/A (N/A) 
1β (EU) -0.258 (0.196) 1.055 (0.948) -0.217 (0.257) 1.098 (0.910) -0.293 (0.481) 1.143 (0.875) 
2β (CI) -13.820 (0.003) 1.032 (0.969) -12.707 (0.008) 1.093 (0.915) -12.644 (0.138) 1.037 (0.963) 
3β (FC) -0.215 (0.830) 1.026 (0.974) -2.283 (0.058) 1.094 (0.914) 1.227 (0.450) 1.049 (0.954) 
4β (FS) -0.260 (0.032) 1.269 (0.788) -0.372 (0.007) 1.186 (0.843) -0.162 (0.438) 1.508 (0.663) 
5β (MBD) -2.676 (0.002) 1.326 (0.754) -2.977 (0.005) 1.278 (0.782) -2.107 (0.145) 1.527 (0.655) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
4.96 
(<0.001) 
6.98 
(<0.001) 
1.24 
(0.305) 
2R  0.187 0.421 0.103 
Variable Coefficients (p-value) 
Intercept 6.622 (0.063) 
ARES   -3.221 (0.029) 
F-Statistic 4.87 (0.029) 
2R  0.042 
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Table 3.5 Propensity Matched sample  
 
Panel A Univariate Test of Differences in Means 
 
 ERM Firms Control Sample Test of Differences in Means 
Variables Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Difference P-value 
P 1.050 26.681 6.216 37.925 -5.166 0.236 
ERMI 0.271 2.664 -0.271 2.620 0.541 0.124 
EU 2.086 1.182 1.981 1.187 0.106 0.501 
CI 0.954 0.051 0.948 0.088 0.005 0.565 
FC 0.473 0.231 0.394 0.722 0.079 0.270 
FS 8.694 2.153 8.318 2.482 0.375 0.224 
MBD 1.250 0.305 1.155 3.960 0.095 0.798 
Number of Obs 114 114  
 
Panel B  Regression of ERMI on Contingent Variables 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6i i i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBD ERMβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +   
 Total Sample 
High Performing Firms 
(Excess Return>2%) 
The Other Firms 
(Excess Return≤ 2%) 
Number of Obs 228 112 116 
Variables Coefficients (p-value) 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
0β (Intercept) 5.832 (0.023) 13.721 (<0.001) 3.990 (0.348) 
1β (EU) -0.380 (0.010) -0.258 (0.109) -0.504 (0.071) 
2β (CI) -6.406 (0.017) -13.463 (0.001) -4.899 (0.264) 
3β (FC) -0.144 (0.825) -0.478 (0.593) 0.300 (0.755) 
4β (FS) 0.089 (0.241) -0.022 (0.823) 0.135 (0.274) 
5β (MBD) 0.036 (0.778) 0.015 (0.930) 0.001 (0.996) 
6β (ERM) 0.591 (0.090) 0.324 (0.446) 0.700 (0.210) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
2.80 
(0.012) 
2.99 
(0.010) 
1.36 
(0.238) 
2R  0.071 0.146 0.070 
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Table C Residual Analysis (All 114 ERM Firms and 114 non-ERM Matched Firms) 
 
0 1i i iP ARESβ β ε= + +             
                                     
Variable Coefficients (p-value) 
Intercept 10.835 (<0.001) 
ARES  -3.825 (<0.001) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
11.82 
(<0.001) 
2R  0.050 
 
P (firm performance) is measured by the one-year excess stock market return at the year end of 2005. ERMI (ERM 
Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑ , where all indicators are defined in 
Appendix D. EU (Environmental uncertainty)= ( )3
1
log ( )
k
k
CV X
=
∑ , where 5 2,
1
( ) ( ) / 5
k k t k k
t
CV X z z z
=
= −∑ , 
, , , 1
( )
k t k t k t
z X X
−
= − , 
,k tX = uncertainty surrogate k in year t, k = 1 to 3 to represent market (sales, Compustat #12), 
technological (sum of R&D Compustat #46 and capital expenditures Compustat #128 divided by total assets Compustat 
#6) or income (net income, Compustat #170) uncertainty, and kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty 
surrogate k. CI (Competition Within Industry) is measured as (1- HHI), where HHI represents the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market and market share is each firm’ s sales (Compustat #12) divided by the total sales 
of the industry. FC(Firm complexity) is measured by the number of business segments (from Compustat Segments) for 
each firm. FS(Firm size) is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets (Compustat #6). MBD(Monitoring 
by Board of Director) is measured by the number of directors for each firm divided by the natural logarithm of sales, 
where number of directors was hand collected from the 2005 10-K files of firms. 
 13.721 - 0.258 - 13.463 0.478 - 0.022 +0.015 0.324
i i i i i i i
ERMI EU CI FC FS MBD ERM= − + . 
i i i
ARES ERMI ERMI= − .     
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Table 3.6 Different Cutoffs of High Performing Firms 
Panel A Regression of ERMI on Contingency Variables  0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBDβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
 High Performing Firms are firms with one year excess return > 
 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
Number of 
High-Perform  62 60 54 52 48 46 42 40 38 37 33 
Variables Coef (p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
0β (Intercept) 21.265 (<0.001) 21.019 (<0.001) 20.626 (<0.001) 20.239 (<0.001) 20.037 (<0.001) 19.734 (<0.001) 19.420 (<0.001) 19.833 (<0.001) 13.683 (0.012) 13.827 (0.013) 13.121 (0.019) 
1β (EU) -0.150 (0.388) -0.154 (0.383) -0.217 (0.257) -0.204 (0.291) -0.209 (0.259) -0.203 (0.309) -0.183 (0.385) -0.155 (0.479) -0.106 (0.624) -0.111 (0.613) -0.065 (0.784) 
2β (CI) -13.517 
(0.001) 
-13.317 
(0.002) 
-12.707 
(0.008) 
-12.494 
(0.010) 
-12.170 
(0.009) 
-12.100 
(0.011) 
-11.767 
(0.019) 
-11.463 
(0.024) 
-7.915 
(0.105) 
-8.029 
(0.108) 
-8.090 
(0.116) 
3β (FC) -2.458 (0.017) -2.395 (0.025) -2.283 (0.058) -2.384 (0.051) -2.362 (0.044) -2.259 (0.061) -2.122 (0.108) -2.453 (0.077) -2.050 (0.114) -2.112 (0.117) -2.011 (0.171) 
4β (FS) -0.379 (0.003) -0.358 (0.007) -0.372 (0.007) -0.341 (0.016) -0.335 (0.014) -0.330 (0.018) -0.330 (0.035) 0.362 (0.027) -0.246 (0.120) -0.251 (0.122) -0.176 (0.334) 
5β (MBD) -2.818 (0.003) -2.929 (0.003) -2.977 (0.005) -3.016 (0.005) -3.089 (0.003) -2.994 (0.005) -3.029 (0.010) -3.232 (0.009) -2.198 (0.067 -2.166 (0.077) -2.104 (0.096) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
8.24 
(<0.001) 
7.98 
(<0.001) 
6.98 
(<0.001) 
6.76 
(<0.001) 
7.54 
(<0.001) 
6.48 
(<0.001) 
5.23 
(0.001) 
5.15 
(0.001) 
2.27 
(0.071 
2.20 
(0.079) 
1.98 
(0.114) 
2R  0.424 0.425 0.421 0.424 0.473 0.448 0.421 0.431 0.262 0.262 0.268 
Panel B Residual Analysis (All 114 ERM Firms)   0 1i i iP ARESβ β ε= + +  
Variables Coef (p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Coef 
(p-val) 
Intercept 
6.771 
(0.056) 
6.810 
(0.055) 
6.622 
(0.063) 
6.693 
(0.060) 
6.770 
(0.058) 
6.713 
(0.060) 
6.772 
(0.059) 
7.034 
(0.049) 
6.226 
(0.077) 
6.207 
(0.078) 
6.327 
(0.074) 
ARES  -3.295 (0.025) 
-3.321 
(0.024) 
-3.221 
(0.029) 
-3.264 
(0.027) 
-3.296 
(0.026) 
-3.273 
(0.027) 
-3.296 
(0.027) 
-3.407 
(0.021) 
-3.015 
(0.039) 
-3.007 
(0.039) 
-3.047 
(0.037) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
5.20 
(0.025) 
5.23 
(0.024) 
4.87 
(0.029) 
5.02 
(0.027) 
5.08 
(0.026) 
4.99 
(0.027) 
5.02 
(0.027) 
5.50 
(0.021) 
4.37 
(0.039) 
4.36 
(0.039) 
4.45 
(0.037 
2R  0.044 0.045 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.047 0.038 0.038 0.038 
P (firm performance) is measured by the one-year excess stock market return at the year end of 2005. ERMI (ERM 
Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑ , where all indicators are defined in 
Appendix D. EU (Environmental uncertainty)= ( )3
1
log ( )
k
k
CV X
=
∑ , where 5 2
,
1
( ) ( ) / 5
k k t k k
t
CV X z z z
=
= −∑ , 
, , , 1
( )
k t k t k t
z X X
−
= − , 
,k tX = uncertainty surrogate k in year t, k = 1 to 3 to represent market (sales, Compustat #12), 
technological (sum of R&D Compustat #46 and capital expenditures Compustat #128 divided by total assets Compustat 
#6) or income (net income, Compustat #170) uncertainty, and kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty 
surrogate k. CI (Competition Within Industry) is measured as (1- HHI), where HHI represents the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market and market share is each firm’ s sales (Compustat #12) divided by the total sales 
of the industry. FC(Firm complexity) is measured by the number of business segments (from Compustat Segments) for 
each firm. FS(Firm size) is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets (Compustat #6). MBD(Monitoring 
by Board of Director) is measured by the number of directors for each firm divided by the natural logarithm of sales, 
where number of directors was hand collected from the 2005 10-K files of firms. 

0 1 2 3 4 5
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ+ + + + +
i i i i i i
ERMI EU CI FC FS MBDβ β β β β β= . 
i i i
ARES ERMI ERMI= − .     
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Table 3.7 Alternative Measure for Monitoring by Board of Directors  
Panel A Regression of ERMI on Contingent Variables 
0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBDβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +   
 
Total 
Sample 
High Performing Firms 
(Excess Return>2%) 
The Other Firms 
(Excess Return≤ 2%) 
Number of Obs 63 30 33 
0β (Intercept) 17.930 (0.002) 
10.482 
(0.219) 
21.557 
(0.008) 
1β (EU) -0.534 (0.026) 
-0.683 
(0.068) 
-0.767 
(0.028) 
2β (CI) -16.611 (0.518) 
-12.452 
(0.114) 
-18.992 
(0.010) 
3β (FC) -0.757 (0.518) 
-1.996 
(0.216) 
0.885 
(0.606) 
4β (FS) -0.092 (0.518) 
0.244 
(0.316) 
-0.129 
(0.515) 
5β (MBD) -0.006 (0.934) 
0.065 
(0.444) 
-0.113 
(0.305) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
3.33 
(0.010) 
2.83 
(0.038) 
2.60 
(0.048) 
2R  0.226 0.371 0.325 
Panel B Residual Analysis (All 63 ERM Firms): 
0 1i i iP ARESβ β ε= + +   
Variable Coefficients
b 
(p-value) 
Intercept 12.595 (0.011) 
ARES  -7.019 (0.005) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
8.63 
(0.005) 
2R  0.124 
P (firm performance) is measured by the one-year excess stock market return at the year end of 2005. ERMI (ERM 
Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑ , where all indicators are defined in 
Appendix D. EU (Environmental uncertainty)= ( )3
1
log ( )
k
k
CV X
=
∑ , where 5 2
,
1
( ) ( ) / 5
k k t k k
t
CV X z z z
=
= −∑ , 
, , , 1
( )
k t k t k t
z X X
−
= − , 
,k tX = uncertainty surrogate k in year t, k = 1 to 3 to represent market (sales, Compustat #12), 
technological (sum of R&D Compustat #46 and capital expenditures Compustat #128 divided by total assets Compustat 
#6) or income (net income, Compustat #170) uncertainty, and kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty 
surrogate k. CI (Competition Within Industry) is measured as (1- HHI), where HHI represents the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market and market share is each firm’ s sales (Compustat #12) divided by the total sales 
of the industry. FC(Firm complexity) is measured by the number of business segments (from Compustat Segments) for 
each firm. FS(Firm size) is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets (Compustat #6). MBD(Monitoring 
by Board of Director) is measured by the number of board meetings for each firm in 2005, where the data is from 
Compustat.  10.482 0.683 12.452 1.996 0.244 0.065
i i i i i i
ERMI EU CI FC FS MBD= − − − + + . 
i i i
ARES ERMI ERMI= − .   
 
 118 
Table 3.8 Alternative Timing of Performance Measure 
Panel A Regression of ERMI on Contingent Variables 
0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i iERMI EU CI FC FS MBDβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
 
Total 
Sample 
High Performing Firms 
(Excess Return>2%) 
The Other Firms 
(Excess Return≤2%) 
Number of Obs 114 70 44 
0β (Intercept) 19.423 (<0.001) 
18.819 
(<0.001) 
20.824 
(0.156) 
1β (EU) -0.258 (0.196) 
-0.204 
(0.333) 
-0.303 
(0.569) 
2β (CI) -13.820 (0.003) 
-11.845 
(0.015) 
-17.171 
(0.211) 
3β (FC) -0.215 (0.830) 
-0.551 
(0.668) 
0.140 
(0.938) 
4β (FS) -0.260 (0.032) 
-0.282 
(0.074) 
-0.235 
(0.300) 
5β (MBD) -2.676 (0.002) 
-3.518 
(<0001) 
-1.460 
(0.408) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
4.96 
(<0.001) 
5.22 
(<0.001) 
0.66 
(0.653) 
2R  0.187 0.290 0.080 
Panel B Residual Analysis (All 114 ERM Firms) 
0 1i i iP ARESβ β ε= + +     
Variable Coefficients (p-value) 
Intercept 17.667 (<0.001) 
ARES  -4.538 (0.038) 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
4.40 
(0.038) 
2R  0.124 
P (firm performance) is measured by the one-year excess stock market return at the year end of 2005. ERMI (ERM 
Index)= 
2
1
k
k
Strategy
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Operation
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Reporting
=
∑ + 2
1
k
k
Compliance
=
∑ , where all indicators are defined in 
Appendix D. EU (Environmental uncertainty)= ( )3
1
log ( )
k
k
CV X
=
∑ , where 5 2
,
1
( ) ( ) / 5
k k t k k
t
CV X z z z
=
= −∑ , 
, , , 1
( )
k t k t k t
z X X
−
= − , 
,k tX = uncertainty surrogate k in year t, k = 1 to 3 to represent market (sales, Compustat #12), 
technological (sum of R&D Compustat #46 and capital expenditures Compustat #128 divided by total assets Compustat 
#6) or income (net income, Compustat #170) uncertainty, and kz = mean of changes over 5 years of uncertainty 
surrogate k. CI (Competition Within Industry) is measured as (1- HHI), where HHI represents the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market and market share is each firm’ s sales (Compustat #12) divided by the total sales 
of the industry. FC(Firm complexity) is measured by the number of business segments (from Compustat Segments) for 
each firm. FS(Firm size) is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets (Compustat #6). MBD(Monitoring 
by Board of Director) is measured by the number of directors for each firm divided by the natural logarithm of sales, 
where number of directors was hand collected from the 2005 10-K files of firms. 
 18.819-0.204 -11.845 -0.551 -0.282 -3.518
i i i i i i
ERMI EU CI FC FS MBD= . 
i i i
ARES ERMI ERMI= − .  
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